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ABSTRACT
The history of the Ford Motor Company pertaining to the
Edpel is reviewed in comparison to a theory of the firm, which
suggests a utility maximization vice the classical profit
l
maximization concept. The conclusion is reached and tends to
support the utility maximization concept. Additionally, the
conclusion is reached that the utility maximization concept is
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In 1963, Oliver E. Williamson's doctoral dissertation on the
subject of managerial objectives in a theory of the firm was given
a Ford Foundation award and published by Prentice-Hall. In
this dissertation, Williamson proposes to answer the following
questions:
(1) What are the primary motives of management?
(2) Can these be provided with operational significance?
(3) Can such a translation of managerial objectives be
introduced into a theory of the firm from which meaningful
theories can be derived?
(4) How do differences in competition in the product market,
in managerial tastes, and in the diffusion of stockholders
influence the allocation of resources within the firm?
(5) What is the evidence that discretion has a significant
2
and systematic impact on business behavior?
Oliver Williamson, The Economics of Discretionary
Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm





In this chapter, Williamson s argument will be described
from a neutral view. The purpose is to explain or summarize his
argument
.
His argument has as its base the following concepts. There
is general agreement that within the domain of perfect
competition (broadly conceived), the classical theory of the firm
is an exceptionally appropriate and accurate description of
behavior. It is not always appreciated, however, that this
theory achieves its power due to the constraints on the
"opportunity set" of choices open to the firm under these
circumstances, rather than because of the inherent accuracy of
its behavioral assumptions. Where competitors are numerous and
entry is easy, persistent departures from profit maximizing
behavior lead inevitably to extinction. Economic natural
selection holds the stage. Economists then can confidently
predict industry behavior without being explicitly concerned with
3
the behavior of individual units.
When the conditions of competition are relaxed, the
opportunity set of the firm is expanded. In this case, the




interest, both for purposes of interpreting particular behavior
4
within the firm and in the industry aggregate.
He points out, that if economists are to inquire into the
processes by which firms are operated the following propositions
from organization theory must be considered:
(1) Behavior is responsive to perceived, rather than
hypothetical, rewards.
(2) Personal goals influence organizational participation.
(3) Organizational slack is absorbed by knowledgeable and
active participants.
(4) Organizational viability requires a value consensus and,
hence, precludes arbitrary assignment of goals.
(5) Individuals achieve an economy of effort by selective
pursuit of goals in accordance with the capacity of the
environment to produce satisfaction.
In the case of profit maximization, Williamson argues that
it appears that the superiority of the assumption depends on
additional assumptions which are not correct in all cfeses, for:




Ibid. , p. 4.
5Ibid. , pp. 6-8.

(2) Economic natural selection does not necessarily apply in
the monopoly sector.
(3) The transfer of monopoly ownership through transactions
in the capital market is not in all cases likely to be effective in
changing managerial control.
On the basis of these arguments he finds that the appropriate
behavioral assumption may not be one of profit maximization,
and recourse to a different line of investigation is required. The
superiority of the profit maximization assumption, as compared
with alternative constructions, must rest on factual rather than
logical grounds. Thus the questions become: What alternative
behavioral assumptions are proposed? What are their
7implications? And what does the evidence support?
The alternative assumption proposed is based on the
>
following arguments.
The behavior of people in organizations is purposive in two
senses. First, behavior must be minimally oriented to a common
organizational purpose, or it would not be meaningful to speak of
an organization. Secondly, behavior within organizations is







The theory of the firm has traditionally recognized only the
first of these goals, or, to the extent that the importance of
personal goals has been acknowledged, these have seldom been
made to have an explicit influence on the analysis. Indeed,
even the minimally oriented organizational purpose of earning
positive profits has generally been displaced by the assumption
' 8
that firms are operated so as to maximize profits.
Out of the host of factors that influence the behavior of the
individual in all his capacities, only a subset is likely to be of
major importance for understanding his behavior as a manager.
The partitioning of motives according to role is appropriate,
if derived from the propositions that:
(1) Not every social situation which the individual
encounters is equally efficient in satisfying each particular need
(2 J Satisfaction of a need in one capacity (for example, as a
manager) has spillover value to other capacities.
Rational behavior, therefore, requires that the individual
discriminate in his attempts to achieve need satisfaction. This
selective pursuit of gpals means that we can properly limit the
analysis of behavior in any one environmental sector to that
8
Ibid. , p. 28.

subset of goals that is immediately relevant to that sector. The
criteria for selection of goals to be included in the subset are:
(1) What satisfactions is the environment particularly well-
suited to satisfy?
Q
(2) What needs does the environment create?
From the above criteria, Williamson arrives at the following
conclusions:
In the operation of a business firm, the following are the
immediate determinants of behavior: salary, security, status,
power, prestige, social service, professional excellence.
Obviously, the objectives are interdependent and can be
reduced, relative to opportunities available in other environmental
situations. The opportunity to attend to social service
objectives in the business firm is not too great and, to simplify,












In general, managers operating in firms in the monopolistic
sector should have relatively more opportunity to become sated
with respect to security and dominance needs and, hence, give
more attention to professional objectives than would managers in
the competitive sector. Even social service objectives may
become operative in regulated industries, such as public utilities
and communications.
The notion of expense preference is developed for the
purpose of making the connection between motives and economic
activity.
The desirability of transforming these nonpecuniary
objectives into pecuniary terms, therefore, suggests itself to
Williamson. He feels this indirect approach corresponds to the
observation that, although desires cannot be measured directly,
they can be measured by the outward phenomena to which they
give rise.
By expense preference I mean that managers do not
• have a neutral attitude toward all classes of expenses.
Instead, some types of expenses have positive values
attached to them: they are incurred not merely for their
11Ibid., p. 32

contributions to productivity (if any) but, in addition, for
the manner in which they enhance the individual and
collective objectives of managers. Conventional economic
theory treats all expenses symmetrically: individuals are
indifferent toward costs of all types. Expense preference
replaces this attitude of indifference by positive tastes for
certain classes of expenses. Asymmetry thus develops in
the attitude toward costs.
Although the resulting model is expressed entirely in
monetary units, it should not be interpreted as one in which
pecuniary goals are the only objectives of the firm. Rather, the
nonpecuniary goals Williamson indicated are manifested through
the mechanism of expense preference , and in this way are
assumed to influence the operation of the firm in systematic and
predictable ways.
It should be emphasized, however, that the connections
described below for relating motives to behavior are assumed .
Staff: It is assumed that the management has a positive
expense preference for staff. Roughly this corresponds to
general administrative and selling expense.
The selective expansion of operations may easily be
perceived by the management as having benefits that can be





Since promotional opportunities within a fixed-size firm are
limited (while to increase jurisdiction has the same general
effect as promotion but simultaneously produces the opportunity
for advance to all) , the incentive to expand staff may be
difficult to resist. Being a means to promotion, expansion of
staff serves to advance both salary and dominance objectives
simultaneously. In addition, staff can contribute to the
satisfaction of security and professional achievement objectives
as well.
Organization theorists have observed that the modern
organization is a prolific generator of anxiety and insecurity.
This insecurity is partly due to uncertainty with respect to the
survival of the organization as a whole and more importantly (and
more immediately relevant to its individual members) of the parts
with which the individuals identify. Attempts to reduce this
condition can be expected. The direction these efforts will take
can be anticipated. If the surest guarantee of the survival of
the individual parts appears to be size, efforts to expand the
separate staff functions can be predicted.
The "professional" inducement to expand staff arises from
the typical view that a progressive staff is one that is

continuously providing more and better services. An aggressive
staff will, therefore, be looking for ways to expand. Although
the relative contribution to productivity will be considered in
choosing directions for expansion, the absolute effect on profit
may be neglected. As long as the organization is able to satisfy
its acceptable-level performance requirements, the tendency to
value staff apart from reasons associated with its productivity
produces a predisposition to extend programs beyond the point
13
where marginal costs equal marginal benefits.
The second connection for relating motives to behavior is:
Emoluments . The term emoluments is used in a some-
what special sense. It refers to that portion of management
salaries and perquisites that is discretionary. That is,
emoluments represent rewards which, if removed, would not
cause the managers to seek other employment. They are
economic rents and have associated with them zero
productivities. They are not a return to entrepreneurial
capacity but instead result from the strategic advantage that
the management possesses in the distribution of returns to
monopoly power. Being a source of material satisfaction
and an indirect source of status and prestige, they are
desirable as a means for satisfying goals in each of these
respects.
Tax considerations aside, the management would
normally prefer to take these emoluments as salary rather
than as perquisites of office since taken as salary, there
are no restrictions on the way in which they are spent,





(such as expense accounts, executive services, office
suites, and so forth), there are specific limitations on the
ways these can be enjoyed. *
The third connection is the profit term.
Discretionary Profit . Positive profits constitute the
minimally oriented organizational purpose. Thus, zero
profits place a lower bound on what is consistent with
survival, whereas maximum profits place an upper bound on
what is attainable.
Discretionary profit is that amount by which earnings
exceed minimum performance constraint. That the managers
should desire to earn profits that exceed the acceptable
level derives from the relationship that profit bears to
discretion, self-fulfillment , and organizational achievement.
Since expansion of staff and emoluments can scarcely
proceed independently of the expansion of physical
facilities, and since financing of this expansion (whether
from internal or external sources) will be tied to profitability
of the firm, profits in excess of the minimum acceptable
level may well be desired by the management. Moreover,
managers derive satisfaction from self-fulfillment and
organizational achievement and profit is one measure of
this success. Taken together, these considerations favor





From the view of the arguments reviewed to this point,
Williamson formulates his models in which it is assumed that
The firm is operated so as to maximize a utility function
that has as principal components, staff, emoluments, and
discretionary profit, subject to the constraint that reported
profit be greater than or equal to the minimum acceptable
level of profit demanded. °
14Ibid., p. 35.





Two other considerations are given with regard to the
development of the utility function. Williamson argues that
modem organization theory has tended to treat the firm as a
coalition (managers, workers, stockholders, suppliers,
customers) , the members of which have conflicting demands
which must be reconciled if the firm is to remain a going concern,
In the sense that each group in the coalition is essential to the
firm's continuing existence, the coalition can be considered as
one in which the members are "equals.*; This view is more
useful when observing the firm in a period of crisis than one in
which survival is not a pressing problem. When survival is not
a current concern, restoring a hierarchy of the members based on
the attention they give to the firm's operation, leads to more
productive insights. Management emerges, in this respect, as
the chief member of the coalition. Its role as coordinating and
initiating member as well as its access to information permit it
to assume this position of primacy. Under normal conditions,
then, it is appropriate to take the demands of the other members
as given and leave it to the discretion of management to operate
the firm in some best sense. His models are formulated and
17





The second consideration is the question of social choice.
How can a single valued objective function be imputed to the
firm? In the profit maximizing assumption, no question of a
single value function is raised nor can it be an important issue,
for managers will choose to operate the firm in the profit
maximizing fashion. There is an assumption of unanimity. Due
to this strong assumption, the theory provides predictions on
how the firm will react to changes in data.
This assumption is sufficiently accurate to permit the
theory to handle a large class of circumstances of interest to
18
economics. The argument on this point is that the existence
of instituational uniformities justifies the assumption of an
19
organizational utility function.
This uniformity is essential to the viability of any
organization. The value consensus in the business firm is due
to the combined effects of a screening - selection proceedure
with a socialization process. The former tends to provide




Ibid. , p. 162.
13

is a process by which the major values of the groups are
internalized by its individual members. ^
The group maintenance needs and processes are certain to
produce a leadership wherein decisions are made in a fashion
21
that reflect collective preferences.
The following is a summary of the arguments:
In the absence of vigorous competition in the product
market, and where the separation of ownership from control is
substantial, there is no compelling reason to assume that the
firm is operated so as to maximize profit. Such behavior would
appear to require an unusual degree of rationality, a complete
detachment of individual interest from occupational decision
making. Williamson proposes that, where discretion in the
decision making unit exists, this will ordinarily be exercised in
a fashion that reflects the individual interests of the decision
makers. Because most of the decision making in the firm
ultimately involves spending, "expense preference" woul$.be a
useful and meaningful way in which to study the behavior of the
business firm. Two categories of expense preference were
20
Ibid., p. 154.
21 Ibid. , p. 155.
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identified and related to the motives of managers. They are the
positive preference for staff and the positive preference for
emoluments. A third preference category is identified as dis-
22
cretionary profit.
Williamson proceeds to develop models that are responsive
to some of his criticisms of the classical theory of the firm. This
involves the construction of utility functions for the firm that
makes the notion of "expense preference" explicit. He compares
the responses with alternative models of the firm, the first being
the "usual or single-period profit maximizing model," the second,
a "discounted or multi-period profit maximization model," and
finally he compares these to Baumol's sales maximization
23hypothesis. Williamson classifies the models as
"entrepeneurial models" in the case of the profit maximization
24
models. The utility models he develops are classified as
25
"managerial discretion" models.
He constructs the managerial models in three forms for














profit entering into the utility function, a model with emoluments
and discretionary profifs, and a combined model, (staff,
discretionary profits, emoluments).
Since, for expository purposes, the staff model and the
combined staff and emoluments model display the principles,
discussion in this paper will be limited to these models, and the
profit maximization models. The similarities and differences
between these models and their responses will also be
discussed. A full discussion and demonstration of the models
responses are contained in Chapters IV and V in his work. The
following analysis, in the main, is directly quoted from his
, 26
work.
These terms enter into the analysis:
R = revenue = PX; 32R/ dX <?& >0
P = price = P(X, S; E); ^P/ ^X^COj 3?/^S>-0't
X = output
S = staff (in money terms), or (approximately) general
administrative and selling expense
E = the condition of the environment (a demand shift
parameter)
C = production cost = C(X)
26
Ll2id. , pp. 40-45. Describes the staff model.




M = managerial emoluments
Tr = actual profit = R - C - S
' ' R = reported profit = TT- M
I b = minimum (after tax) profit demanded
T = taxes, where t = tax rate and f = lump-sum tax
fT -T£,~T = discretionary profit
R
U = the utility function
With staff and discretionary profit entering into the utility
function, the firm's objective is taken to be
maximize: U = U(S/TT- TL - T)
subject to:TT;> T£ + T
The constraint can be written as T7- TT^ - T^O.
Assuming diminishing marginal utility and disallowing corner
solutions, it follows that the firm will always choose values of
its decision variables that will yield positive utility with
respect to each component of its utility function. The second
component is TT- TT - T. if it is always to be positive, then
the constraints will always be satisfied as an inequality. Thus
the constraint is redundant and the problems can be treated as
one of straight-forward maximization. Substituting the
functional relationships for profits into the expression yields:
17

Maximize: TJ = U (s, (1 - t) (R - C - S - T) - VTQ J
The following first-order results are obtained by setting the
partial derivatives of U with respect to X and S equal to zero.
(1) _£R = 2Q_
Sx dx
(2) J?R= -U! + (1 -t)U2
8J? (i - t)u2
(In this expression, U^ is the first partial of the utility function
with respect to S and U2 is the first partial with respect to
(1 -t) (R-C -S -T) - %.)
From equation 1 we observe that the firm makes its
production decision in the conventional fashion by equating
marginal gross revenue to the marginal costs of production.
However, Equation 2 reveals that the firm will employ staff in
the region where the marginal value product of staff is less than
its marginal cost. That is, the firm will operate where
PR/ <9S<1, whereas the usual short-period profit maximization
model would employ staff only to the point where the Equality




_£|= 1 - 1 Ul
a
r. l - 1 u 2
18

where Uf/Uo *s tne mar9inal rate °f substitution between profit
and staff; an increase in the ratio reflects a shift in tastes in
favor of staff. In a profit maximizing organization this ratio is
zero. These relationships are displayed graphically in Figure 1.
With staff plotted along the ordinate and output along the
abscissa, isoprofit contours are imbedded in the XS plane. These
contours are elliptical with major axes running from southwest
to northeast.
That this is the correct relationship follows from the
assumption that 5^R/ 3X #S>0. Under this assumption, the
effect of increasing staff is to shift the marginal revenue curve
of the standard price-quantity demand curve to the right so that
necessarily, whatever the shape of the marginal cost of
production curve, the optimum output increases as staff
increases. To preserve this property in the construction of an
isoprofit map on the output-staff plane requires that the






Connecting points of tangency between the isoprofit contours
and a series of horizontal lines at successively greater levels
of staff traces out the locus R^ = Gx --i.e. , the locus of
optimal output given the level of staff expense. Similarly the
points of tangency between the isoprofit contours and a series of
vertical lines drawn at successively greater levels of output
yields the locus R
s
= 1. Their intersection K, corresponds to
the short-run profit maximization position.
Since the equilibrium relations are 1^ = Cx and Rs< 1,
the utility mazimizing firm will take up a position somewhere
along the locus Rx = Cx but above the locus Rg = 1 . Point A in
Figure 1 represents such a position. Thus, the utility minimizing
firm will choose a larger value of staff, and this will in turn give
20

rise to a larger value of output than would be chosen by the firm
that maximizes short-run profit.
The locus
^x
- Cx specifies the pairs of (X,S) combinations
along which the firm that has its utility function augmented to
include a staff component will locate. For every value of staff
there exists an optimal value of outputs, say X, where X = f(S).
Given the condition of the environment, profit depends on the
choice of X and S, that is, 1T= g(X, S; E). If however, X is
chosen optimally, then
TT= g(X, S; E) = g [f(S), S; e] = g' (S;E)
Thus, profit can be plotted as a function of staff. This is done
i
in Figure 2 with profit along the ordinate and staff along the
abscissa. By introducing indifference curves between profit and
staff, the quilibrium results can be interpreted somewhat
differently. Again, the point K represents the profit maximizing
position and A, the point where the tangency between the
indifference curves and the profits curve obtains, is the position




(1 - t)TT- IT
Figure 2
Several generalizations suggest themselves immediately.
First, for the firm to select the point K requires that the slope of
the indifference curves in the region around K be zero; that is,
the marginal rate of substitution between profits and staff must
be zero. Since MRS = - d1T * dV/<9S . this implies that the
dS dV/d1T
marginal utility of staff in the vicinity of K must be zero. Either
staff must be "objectively" valued only for its contribution to
profit or the benefits associated with expanding staff must be
exhausted before K is reached. If the argument regarding the
positive preference for staff is accepted, the first of these can
be dismissed and the second represents a limiting condition.
Considering the variety of ways in which staff contributes to
managerial satisfactions, the zero marginal utility condition
seems unlikely to be realized.
22

A second observation is that if the profit curve is very
sharply peaked, the resulting tangency will be one where the
value of staff (and output) selected will not be far removed from
the profit maximization position. As the profit curve becomes
flatter, however, and as the indifference curves become more
steeply sloped (i.e. , as staff becomes relatively more highly
valued), the tangency shifts progressively to the right.
The Staff and Emoluments Model . Staff and emoluments
terms are both introduced into this model. That is, in addition
to a positive preferene for profit, the management of the firm
also displays a positive expense preference for staff and
corporate personal consumption expenditures. The objective
becomes
maximize: U- U(S, M, TTR - TT - T)
subject to: 1Tr > TTq + T
Again the constraint is redundant so that the problem can be
handled as a conventional maximization one. Substituting the
functional relationships for profit into the expression yields:-
maximize.- U = U [S, M, (1 - t) (R-C-S-M-T)- TQ
First-* order conditions for an extremum are obtained by
setting the partial derivatives of U with respect to X, S, and M





(5) 9K - -u
x
+ (i - t)u 3
c?s
(i - t)u3
(Ul is the first partial of the utility function with respect to S, U 2
is the first partial with respect to M, and U3 is the first partial
with respect to (1 - t) (R - C - S - M - f) - TL.)
(6) U 2 = (1 - t)U 3
Equation 4 reveals that the production decision is again made in
a conventional profit maximizing fashion by equating marginal
gross revenues to the marginal costs of production, and from
Equation 5 it follows that the staff decision is again made so
that the marginal value product of staff is less than its marginal
cost (R
s
< 1) . Equation 6 discloses that the firm will absorb
some amount of actual profit as emoluments, the amount being
dependent on the tax rate.
Although the amount of profit absorbed as emoluments affects





Two versions of "entreprenuirial models" are examined. 2^
The first is a short-run profit maximizing model. It assumes that
the planning horizon extends over a single period. The second
t
" 2ft
is a multiperiod model, a long-run construction."
Williamson states "that these models actually involve an
elaboration of the standard profit maximizing model as applied
to the analysis of monopoly behavior. The elaboration results
from adding a staff term so that P = P(X,S), <?P/^X< and ^P/^S^O,
to the conventional monopoly construction, (where P = P (X)
,
9P/<9X< 0). The argument for neglecting the staff term in the
standard treatment of the theory of the firm is that the production
and staff decisions are symmetrical. Hence, to include both
i
yields no insights that are not obtained by looking at, the output
decision alone*
. . . The necessity for introducing the two terms




The short-run model assumes:









First order conditions for a maximum are found by setting partial








Output is chosen so that marginal gross revenue is equal to
the marginal costs of production, and staff is selected so that
the marginal value product of staff is equal to its marginal cost.
The more responsive entrepreneurial model is obtained by
devising a multi-period, discounted version of the profit
maximization hypothesis. The variables are subscripted by time
periods by i, where i= 1, 2, . .
.
, n, and where n is the
planning horizon. Letting r be the discount rate, profits in
year i will be discounted by 1/(1 + r) 1 ~ l . Let this be
represented by
-, i - 1. Staff expenditures in period K arfc
assumed to have a positive influence on future period revenues
over the entire planning horizon. The length of the period can be
defined as the interval beyond which current production
decisions have no effect, and the length of the planning horizon
as the number of such periods for which current staff expenditures
have a positive effect.
26

Letting TT represent the discounted value of profits, the
objective is to:
n i - 1
maximize Tt = ^- (1 - t) (1^ - C i - S i - T^ 3
i~l
First-order conditions for a maximum are obtained by setting
the partial derivatives of TTwith respect to Xi and S-, equal to





(10) i-i-* ^R: i - 1
Si 1 = 2 &S:: d
Inspection of Equation 9 reveals that the firm chooses that
value of output for which the marginal gross revenue is equal
to the marginal costs of production. Equation 10, however, shows
the current marginal value product of staff is less than its
current marginal cost.
In testing this model for responses, Williamson introduces
a minimum current period profit constraint of the following form:
(1 - t) U
x
•£ Tfc
The Baumol model and the tests applied to it are not




merely serve to lengthen the summary of Williamson's work and
would not be productive of much insight.
The summary of the similarities and differences between the
models and their responses is more germane to understanding and
will not, it is believe , slight the content of Williamson's work.
The models developed were tested in Williamson's work for
comparative static responses for change in the following
parameters: E (the demand shift, environment), t (a change in
profit tax rate) , and f (a lump sum tax) . The models can be
compared on this basis.
Managerial Discretion model:
(1) Staff expenditures will absorb significant amounts of
resources under conditions of favorable demand. These
"excesses" will tend to disappear in the face of adversity.
(2) Expenditures for emoluments will tend to vary directly
with the business cycle.
(3) Staff expenditures will increase if an excess profits tax
is imposed. The same is true of emoluments.
(4) The lump sum tax will reduce expenditures for staff,
emoluments; output will also be reduced, since optimal output





(1) Emoluments are not included in these models.
(2) Staff and output will move with the shift in environment.
(3) The response to the effects of a profit tax and lump sum
tax contradict the discretion models. The short-run model is
unresponsive to a shift in profits tax or a lump sum tax.
Discretion models predict staff and output adjustments will occur
in response to both types of tax. The multi-period model
responses are more complex and depend on application of the
constraint and on application of a "permanent" or "temporary"
tax. In general , the multi-period model indicates staff and out-
put will both be increased in response to a temporary tax, a
permanent tax produces no change, and the lump sum tax
produces no change.
Williamson summarizes as follows:
Although the direction of the response under the
alternative hypotheses may be the same, there may hp
grounds for discriminating between the theories on the
basis of differences in their gross quantitative implications.
.
the utility maximizing firm will generally undergo larger
adjustments in response to change in demand than will the
profit maximizing organization, and these will tend to be
concentrated in staff and emoluments. As indicated, these
31Ibid. , pp. 81-83.
29

differences are due to the calculated accumulation (and,
hence, decumulation) of staff and emoluments in the former
that are not present in the latter. 32
This gross quantitative result, Williamson states, "cannot
be derived at a completely general level." It can, he states, be
shown to be reasonable. The difference obtains from the fact
that the utility maximizing firm has exhibited a positive taste
for staff and has accumulated more than a profit maximizer would
in the same circumstances. The size of adjustment would depend
on "the change in the shape of the profit-as-a-function-of-staff-
curve," the change in discretionary profit, and the tastes of the
33
management for staff.
Williamson uses the following graphic representation of a
shift in profits as a function of staff. The direct vertical
displacement of the curve is justified only because of ease of
graphic treatment. "Actually," he states, "a more peaked
34
condition would be reasonable. "
32












Williamson provides three case histories in which the
adversity encountered consisted of a pairing of a leveling off
in demand together with a drop in profitability and examines the
cases in a general manner.
His evaluations take largely descriptive forms. An
example:
. . .Possibly such a reconciliation can be performed
without invoking the notion of expense preference. But
clearly the explanation is much less difficult to provide if
it is assumed that the firm displayed a positive preference
for staff in the period preceding the profit decline. 35
In another instance:
The evidence seems to be roughly consistent with the
discretion model. Thus the response of the firm to
adversity is one where "ever-expanding" staff is removed
and emoluments disappear. The more severe the conditions,







tion hypothesis also predicts staff will be reduced in
response to adversity, it is absolutely silent with regards
to emoluments and quantitatively may be difficult to
reconcile the amounts of the cutbacks observed, using a
model constructed entirely around the profit maximization
assumption. ...
Williamson states that the demand shift parameter is
difficult to deal with if demand goes negative in the models he
proposes and "analysis would be complicated if substantial
37
changes in output occurred as a result of adversity.
"
The last points are mentioned, not in an argumentive sense,
but to avoid misinterpretation of his thesis, since the adversity








In September, 1957, the Ford Company introduced a line of
so called medium priced automobiles, the Edsel line. The line
was developed, produced and sold to the public with as much
determined effort, energy and expenditure of resources that a
corporation the size of Ford could expend, and yet only eight
hundred and five days later, the Edsel, as a product, slipped
into the past history of the American economy.
The rise and sudden fall of a new product in the automobile
industry would be of little significance considering the frequency
with which such products have come and gone were it not for the
fact that Ford eagerly embarked on the venture knowing the
dismal record of previous attempts in this area.
In the history of the United States automobile industry, 2,900
makes had been introduced, and by 1957 only about 20 were still
on the scene. The record during the maturity of the industry was
as dim as it had been in the days of the Black Crow (1905), the
Averageman' s Car (1906), the Bugmobile (1907), the Dan Patch
(1911). The big three, General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford had
in later days introduced only the La Salle (1927), the Plymouth
(1928), and Ford's last attempt, the Lincoln Zephyr and the
33

Mercury (1938). During the post-war years, the futile efforts of




The enormity of the risks of introducing a new automobile
was possibly best summed up by Henry J. Kaiser in 1955 when he
wrote:
We expected to toss fifty million dollars into the





Yet the Ford Company was willlitg to expend a reported
quarter of a billion dollars on the Edsel from conception to
40introduction into the market
.
The company reported in early June, 1957, that 150 million
dollars had been spent on basic facilities. This includes
conversion required in plants to produce the car, 50 million
dollars on special Edsel tooling, and 50 million dollars on initial
advertising and promotion. Additionally, at this time, the Edsel
division had added to the corporation payrolls eighteen hundred
oo00John N . Brooks , The Fate of the Ed sel and Other Business







salaried employees and began to hire approximately fifteen
41thousand factory workers.
The market into which the Edsel was introduced was a
difficult market. Fortune Magazine characterized it by saying,
"in the late 1950' s, no big business has had a more uneven time
of it than the automobile industry and never in its own erratic
42history has its fortune been so inconsistent."
Fortune's analysts felt that the problem started in 1953 when
the industry finally seemed to have satisfied the post-war
shortage of cars. This shortage had been prolonged by the
Korean War.
In 1953, people had lots of money to spend but their
demand for cars in unit terms was beginning to slow down.
The industry met this challenge by offering more car per car,
innovations like power steering, power brakes, automatic
transmissions and frequent and striking style changes, so
despite recession, 1954 dollar sales stayed high.
The year 1955 was marked by the "easy credit terms" then
available and this coupled with innovations made 1955 the record
41Ibid., p. 41.
42Gilbert Burck, Sanford Parker, "Detroit's Next Decade,"





year for the decade; 7,400,000 units were sold with a dollar
44
sales of 15.8 billion dollars.
In 1956, sales fell to 5,900,000 units, ascribed generally
45by the industry to overbuying the previous year. The year 1957
was a six million unit year and 1958 was a 4,700,000 unit year.
Fortune, in looking at this situation, assigns the problem
to a too rapid car per car build up, coupled with an increasing
realization per unit (in constant dollars) and by this time the
industry had limited its potential market by cutting off buyers.
. . . .the industry got 25 percent more real dollars per
car than it got before the war. Between 1953 and 1957, it
got another 10 to 12 percent. In the same years, however,
unit sales rose only 4.5 percent. Value per car, in other
words rose faster than consumer income. At the same time,
the motor industry made its cars too much alike in
appearance and price as well as size and power. By 1957,
it took an expert to distinguish a fully equipped low price
range car from a middle price range or even high price range
car either in cost or appearance. Alfred Sloan used to say
that it should be General Motors aim to provide a car for
every purse and purpose. But by 1957-58 most of the
industry found itself providing a more or less uniform car for
a limited number of purposes. "
44See appendix, Table III.
^Sidney Furst and M. Sherman, Business Decisions Tlaat ,
Changed Our Lives (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 353-3^9
46Gilbert Burck, Sanford Parker, "Detroit's Next Decade,"
Fortune
,
LX No. 4 (October, 1959), pp. 112-115.
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Paradoxically as people's incomes rose, they were less
i
inclined to put more money into single cars. Most families in
the 4,000 dollar and over income groups were not suburbanites




president of American Motors, stated*that
during this period American Motors felt that in addition to the
increase in multiple car owners, another trend could be noted in
consumer buying habits.
There was increasing competition for the dollars that
formerly went into the purchase of long, showy and costly
automobiles. Backyard swimming pools, boats, winter
vacations and higher education for children were diverting
disposable income into new channels. ?
The new contestants who entered this market were the Edsel
and American Motors. Rambler sales grew during the industry's
recession period from 100,000 in 1956 to 500,000 in 1958 and by
the time the Edsel was no more (1959), all the major producers
were manufacturing a compact.
47
Furst and Sherman, op. cit . , p. 359.
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Interestingly , the large car sales moved with the surge
in the compacts in 1959-1960. Which shows that keeping
your eye on the margin pays even in the auto industry. ^8
The failure of the Edsel, of course, created considerable
comments in the periodicals of the day; Business Week, U. S .
News and World Report , Motor Trend , Time , and such unlikely
publications as Etc.
,
the New Yorker and Harpers , not to
mention newspapers , notably the New York Times and Wall Street
Tournal . More complete comment is found in the books by Brooks,
Nevins, and Furst cited in this paper. The consensus of their
post mortems on the why of the Edsel failure are assembled
below:
The Economy: (1) the recession of 1958; (2) the narrowing
of the market previously cited.
The Design and Quality of the Car: (1) the Edsel styling
was poor, appearance was ludicrous; (2) the consumers disliked
the front shield (dubbed the horse-collar); (3) there were too
many mechanical imperfections in the first cars delivered; (4) the
design of the car was not distinctive.
Marketing and Advertising : (1) the middle priced market is
impossible to break into; (2) the price policy was poor because
48feurck and Parker, op. cit. , p. 115.
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the Edsel was priced both above and below the Mercury, and this
confused the buyers; (3) "Ford cavalierly dismissed the consumer
49
. . .
.and as such the failure of the Edsel is a legend. " (4) "When
the public is wooed in an excessively calculated manner it tends
to turn away in favor of some gruffer but more spontaneously
attentive suiter." (5) the publicity campaign was allowed to
degenerate.
Organizational Problems : (1) Ford executives were too
"bullish in their outlook;" (2) the failure was due to the time lag
between the decisions to produce the automobile and the act of
putting it on the road, (a little more than two years); (3) intra-
mural competition between the divisions of the Ford corporation;
(4) the merger of the Edsel divisions with the Lincoln-Mercury
division in January, 1958, making the product a "step child;"
(5) the creation of an Edsel division and dealer organization which
made the product subject to immature executive leadership;
(6) irrational behavior on the part of Ford executives, (one
unidentified, for obvious reasons, has been quoted as stating,
"we were auto-intoxicated. ").51
49
Furst and Sherman, op. cit . , p. 15.




Motivational Research : (1) the major strategy in promoting
the Edsel was based on the results of motivational research; and,
since there is no accounting for consumer tastes, the strategy
failed; (2) the name of the car, "Edsel" was a disaster
considering that the promotion was to appeal to the unconscious
quirks of the public; (3) motivational research fails to elicit
meaningful responses from the subjects; (4) the Edsel was a
child of motivational research which resulted in an appeal to
irrationality and when faced with a decision on an expensive
item, the consumer will be rational. When symbolic gratification
can be gained from Playboy , (50 cents a copy), Astounding
Science Fiction
, (35 cents a copy), and television, (free), an
52
expensive automobile cannot compete; (5) David Wallace, the
Edsel' s director of planning for market research, states that the
launching of the Soviet "Sputnik, 1* on October 4, 1957, spoiled
the market because, "it shattered the myth of American technical
pre-eminence, precipitating a public revulsion against the fancy
baubles of Detroit. I don't think we yet know the depths of the
psychological effect that that first orbiting had on us.
. . .
The
52 S. I. Hayakawa, "Why the Edsel Laid An Egg," Etc.
,
Vol XV No. 3 (Spring, 1958), pp. 217-222.
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American people had put themselves on a self-imposed austerity
53
program. Not buying the Edsel was their hair shirt."
The summation of the reasons, a measure of validity in some,
for the failure of the Edsel would appear to be the "classic case
54
of the wrong car, for the wrong market, at the wrong time."
Based on reported dollar investment in the Edsel and the
estimated losses incurred in producing it, the Ford Company
would have been in the same position if, in 1955, it had decided
not to produce the Edsel at all but simply to give away 110,810
units of the Mercury, its comparably priced car. "The Ford
Company, it seemed, had endeared itself. . .by playing the great
American situation-comedy role of Daddy the Bungler."
In another respect, the unhappy end of the Edsel was not as
complete a failure as it seems on the face. Complete figures
are not available in the public reports of the Ford Motor Company,
and the only data available to this writer and Brooks as well was
53 Brooks, op . cit . , pp. 61-70




from these reports and press releases of the company. The
following breakdown, however, is concurred by Nevins and Hill
who had access to the data while preparing their three volume
history of the Ford Company.
Expenditures . 250 million in development, 200 million while
in production, less 100 million of investment salvageable for
other purposes, for a total loss of 350 million dollars.
Sales and Production . Standard volume was estimated at 200
thousand units per year, total sales during the life of the car
(between 26 and 27 months) 109,466. The total production was
110,810. The difference, 1,344 units, largely 1960 models, were
disposed of at greatly discounted prices. The estimated loss per
unit produced was 3,200 dollars (about the price of an additional
unit)
.
Profits. Net income fell from 294 million in 1957, to 116.2
in 1958 (not completely attributed to the Edsel), but climbed back
to 451.4 million in 1959 (the Edsel was still on the market), and
fell a little in 1960 to 427.9 million (no Edsel being produced).
The complete breakdown is in Table I in the appendix. How much
56Allan Nevins and F. E. Hill, Ford Decline and Rebirth




of the fluctuation/to attribute to the Edsel and how much to the
other products which also had a bad year in 1958 cannot be
57determined from the figures available.
Even Brooks, who is not an apologist for the company,
admits that Ford recovered rather nicely. The absolute sizes of
the investment, however, are large and speculation on the
attitude to risk involved, exhibited by the management, is
worthy of considerable consideration, if one views the corporation
from the view of a profit maximizing firm. It is reasonable to
hypothesise that a pure profit maximizer might have arrayed
alternatives on the decision to embark on the venture in the
following manner.
(a) Retain our current share of the market, do nothing.
(b) Gain more of the middle price market by added emphasis
on the Mercury and Lincoln.
(c) Enter the middle price market with Edsel.
(d) Enter the other side of the market with a lower price or
compact car.
S7
John N. Brooks, The Fate of the Edsel and Other Business
Adventures (New York : Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 61-70; "New
Developments in Marketing," Business Week , (June 8, 1957),
p. 61; Ford Motor Company Annual Reports, (1955-60); Allan
Nevins and F. E. Hill, Ford Decline and Rebirth 1933-1962 (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), p. 440.
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Having chosen alternative (c) , the following alternatives
were still available.
(a) Produce and sell in an existing division with existing
dealers.
(b) Produce and sell in an existing division, but create a
new dealer organization.
(c) Produce with a new division but sell through the existing
dealer organization.
(d) Produce with a new division and sell with a new dealer
organization.
Alternative (d) was chosen in the case of the Edsel. It was
the alternative with the greatest expense involved and apparently




It is the purpose of this paper to document the history of
the Edsel and to compare this history to the frame work proposed
by Williamson on the behavior of a firm.
The review will be conducted with the intention, in a limited
sense, of confirming or denying Williamson's assumptions.
Examination of a single case cannot of itself, of course, confirm
or deny, but it can add credibility to assertions for confirmation
or denial.
A review of the history can provide insight into the ways the
firm perceives its problems, a description of the processes it
employs in responding to those problems, and some of the details
of the magnitudes involved. Historical review has a weakness
that is inherent in its method because of the problems of
generalization that arise.
If, however, a theory is to stand, it should be capable of
historic test in the environment that it proposes to explain. The
theory should, on examination, also be subject to an evaluation
in relation to other theories which it attempts to supplant or
complement.





ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CORPORATION'S OBJECTIVES
If Ford managers were to satisfy a utility function made up
of managerial objectives, a value system or value consensus
must be operative.
The image of value is concerned with the rating of the
various parts of our image of the world, according to some
scale of betterness or worseness. 1
It can be assumed that if Ford managers were to judge their
relative position or status in the automobile industry, they
would compare themselves to Chrysler Corporation on the lower
end of the scale and to General Motors at the upper end. In the
case of Ford, the orientation to General Motors was most unique.
When Henry Ford II took up the reins of power after. .
.
September, 1945, he drove a chariot which to discerning
observers resembled the fabled one-hoss shay at the moment
before its collapse. . .some thought it in even worse state
than that. "You've got to remember," said long time
executive, J. R. Davis, "that when young Henry came in
here the company was not only dying, it was already dead,
and rigor mortis was setting in. "2
The company was faced with an overwhelming array of
problems. The managerial structure of the organization, never
'Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image (The University of
Michigan Press, 1956), p. 12.
2Allan Nevins and F. E. Hill, Ford Decline and Rebirth
1933-1962 (New York: Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1963), p. 294.
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clearly defined, had been damaged by power struggles, deaths,
3
resignations, and discharges.
Conversion to peace time production demanded great
expenditures for machine tools, factory remodeling, and new
plants. Scarcities of essential materials, government control
of purchasing and selling were additional problems.
Financial management, because of Henry Ford's hostility
4
to systematic accounting, was confused and "almost chaotic."
Tractor production which had continued during the war had
never shown a profit and did not hold promise of one at that time.
Various activities by Henry Ford outside automotive production
were registering losses. With the exception of the war years,
company operations since 1930 showed an overall deficit, and
greater losses seemed certain before a gain could be registered.
The twenty-eight year old Ford did have, certain assets :
which would, if employed wisely, work to his advantage. He







balance of $685,034,892 as of June 30, 1945, 6 and a base of
effective plants.
I. FORMING THE ORGANIZATION
Henry Ford II approached the company' s problems through two
basic methods. He set out to acquire a group of capable top
executives and through a process of decentralization build a
growing, forward looking organization. His recognition of
management problems shaped by his grandfather's dominant
influence in the management area is largely responsible for the
form the corporation would assume.
Ford's first step was to gather a temporary team. On
September 27, he sent a directive to all chief Ford officials
announcing the men who would head Ford activities.
Manufacturing, M. L. Bricker; Sales and Advertising,
J. R. Davis; Purchasing, C. H. Carroll; Engineering,
R. H. McCarroll; Foreign Operation, R. I. Roberge;
Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, B. J. Craig and
H. L. Morkle; and Industrial Relations, J. S. Bugas. In
this group, Ford had only three men of the highest ability,
Bricker, Davis and Bugas, while he had wanted "eight Of-
ten. " But he was forced to work with what he had and the





On October 3, 1945, he called these men together in a
group to a meeting of what was to be termed the "policy
committee," which began discussions of company problems.
The many problems associated with reconversion prevented
a thorough study that must preceed the essential changes that
had to be made. But, the fact that the way out lay in
disentangling activities that had been lumped together,
decentralization was recognized at these early meetings. For
example:
J. R. Davis, at the first meeting. . .urged that, "In all
cases, complete separation must be had between the sales
organization and the manufacturing organization. "8
On October 18, Ford himself suggested a separate Lincoln
Division, which would have its own purchasing, cost, and sales
qdepartments.
The earliest acquisition of personnel was the Thornton group,
later to be known as the "Whiz Kids. " This group of ten former
Air Force officers, which was eventually to provide Ford with six





November, 1945, and reported for work in February, 1946.
The leader of the group, Charles Bates (Tex) Thornton was,
at the time, head of the Air Force Office of Statistical Control.
The full group consisted of Thornton, George Moore,
Wilbur R. Anderson, Charles E. Bosworth, J. E. Lundy,
Robert L. McNamara, Arjay R. Miller, Ben Davis Mills,
Francis C. Reith, and James O. Wright. Reith was later to play
a dominating role in the Edsel decision.
Henry II had every reason to feel that his acquisition
of the Thronton group had brought the firm a useful reserv/Lor
of talent. He seems never to have considered. . .that it
could serve as a chief force in remaking the company. He
knew that, however high the abilities of the newcomers
might be, they were mere infants in the automotive world,
and would remain so for some time to come . Ford saw that
his primary need was a general direqtor of operations. . .a
man who knew automobiles and the men who made them far
better than did he. 12
The man Ford decided on for this position was Ernest R.
Breech, at the time president of Bendix Aviation Corporation and
n








Breech was a certified public accountant and was employed
by the Yellow Cab Manufacturing Company when it merged with
General Motors in 1925. He moved through the ranks at General
Motors to become general assistant treasurer and then president
of the aeronautical division, North American Aviation and in 1939,
14became a vice-president of General Motors.
Breech was familiar with the Ford operation and being so,
had little desire to join the organization which he knew was
badly deteriorated and which he said he viewed with "contempt
and pity." 15
He later stated that his only reasons for discussing Ford's
offer was that Ford was currently a customer of Bendix.
"I knew I wasn't coming," he recalled. "I liked my
job at Bendix. I named my own board of directors. I was
having a good time. " The only thought in his mind was,
"How am I going to get through this and keep a good
customer?"^- 6
Despite Breech's tactful refusals, Ford kept on his trail and









over, and give him some advice. After having looked things
over, and noting that the company was losing about $10,000,000
a month, and determining that except for the post-war period
with its unusual demand for cars, the situation would be
hopeless, he decided to take Ford's offer.
Breech later stated in an interview that he discussed the
problem with his wife and in the following manner arrived at his
decision.
"Well, here is a young man that is only a year older
than our oldest son. He needs help. This is a great
challenge.
. . .1 hate to take on the job, but if I do not do it,
I will always regret that I did not accept this challenge, fil'
Breech joined the company on July 1, 1946. Along with
Breech came two more graduates of the General Motors
Corporation, Lewis D. Crusoe, by orientation a financial manager
and Harold T. Youngren, an engineer. Actually, Breech had not
accepted Ford's offer until he was assured that these two men
18
would also come to Ford.
Breech's attitude on the Ford Motor Company was largely
shared by the other men who followed Breech to Ford. Crusoe has







"We (at General Motors) looked on Ford as Mr. Kruschcev
looks at West Germany. . . . " 19
Youngren and Crusoe were followed by other General Motors
graduates. Delmar S. Harder was hired in October, 1946, as
vice-president in charge of operations. He displaced Bricker
who was moved to a vice -presidency, but away from direct
operations. Henry Ford has stated that he felt Bricker was
slowing down a bit but that he didn't want to lose the experience
20
Bricker had. Harder had worked with Crusoe at Fisher Body
and had been production supervisor for General Motors.
M. E. Sheppard was another 1946 addition. Sheppard was
from Fisher Body; he assisted Crusoe in the financial plans for
the reorganization which was then in progress.
John Dykstra, a production head at Oldsmobile, was hired
on March 12, 1947. Breech created the position of vice-
president and general counsel. The position was filled by
William T. Gossett, formerly general counsel at Bendix. L
19IMd., p. 317.





It was at this point in the spring of 1947 that Henry Ford was
22quoted as saying, "The first string is now complete."
This listing of personnel acquisitions on the part of Breech
was to be expected and was certainly in line with Henry Ford II'
s
desires.
The only principle executive acquired in this period who was
not from General Motors was Albert J. Browning, who was hired
>
as a vice-president to head purchasing. BroWning came to Ford
in April, 1946, from the War Department, where he had headed
its wartime purchasing activities. Browning's appointment was
encouraged by Breech. *
The men from G. M. were not the only future top executives
of the corporation. Theodore O. Yntema was hired to replace
Crusoe when he moved to the head of the, yet to be created, Ford
Division, and James J. Nance would be hired later still.
The influx from General Motors, was a pronounced on the
lower levels. C. E. Wilson, president of General Motors,
complained of these inroads into his personnel in 1948 when he
22





counted 150 "second and third level people" 24 who had shifted
to Ford
.
II. DECENTRALIZATION AND REORGANIZATION
Breech brought not only men and concepts to Ford, but also
the book. Peter F. Drucker, in April, 1946, had published,
25Concept of the Corporation. Drucker, an outside consultant,
had written the book based on an eighteen month study of the
General Motors Corporation. The book called for, among other
things, decentralization and full participation of employees.
Breech actually carried copies of this book with him when he
26
arrived at Ford. These concepts were not foreign to the
Thornton group which, along with Sheppard, was placed under
Crusoe s direction and worked on reorganization plans for the
company.
The ideas on reorganization that Breech professed, conformed
to the decentralization that Henry Ford II and J. R. Davis had
envisioned. The actual process occurred over a period of several
24Ibid., p. 357.
25Peter F„ Drucker, Concept of the Corporation (New York:
Beacon Press, .1960).





years, with General Motors serving as a model. All six G. M.
cars were produced by self-contained divisions, as were other
products. The central staff of the company laid down general
policy, allotted funds, and distributed information through a
system of committees, but otherwise the divisions were
independent
.
The first step in the decentralization process was the
creation of the Lincoln-Mercury Division at Henry Ford II'
s
direction. In addition, a second step had been taken, the
creation of a Light Car Division which was to produce a small
cheap car by 1947. The light car was a long time Ford objective,
27dating from the late nineteen thirties.
On May 20, 1946, Thornton presented the policy planning
committee with a plan for a project to systematize the organization
of the company. This proposal was accepted and Henry Ford II
placed Thornton in charge of the project. Thornton presented a
letter for Ford 3 s signature which would give him the broad
authority necessary to under take the project. Ford showed it
to Breech, who had not yet arrived at Dearborn. Breech informed







the company. " Breech suggested that the Thornton group retain
its present status until after his arrival at Ford.
Breech placed the planning group directly under Crusoe who
functioned as his executive assistant until he was made
controller and finally vice-president in charge of finance. The
planning group consisted of the Thornton group, M. E. Sheppard
and later the accounting firm of Lybrand, Ross Brothers and
29
Montgomery who were hired to assist in financial planning.
The first organizational efforts of this group resulted in the
proposal of four division; Light Car, Lincoln-Mercury, Rouge
(manufacturing departments and plants), and Ford. Inclusion of
a Ford Division was notable for, objected to by J. R. Davis, it
did not come into existence until three years later. The
organization manaul and financial programs were also presented
and adopted during the same period, August 23, to September 16,
301947. The language and classification system of the manual
adopted the G. M. system "which Breech, Crusoe, Youngren,
31









The key, of course, in the decentralization was the
establishment of "profit centers," a term which appears to have
been coined at Ford in this period and would later pass into
32
popular use.
The organization's general form was completed, with the
exception of the Ford Division, by May, 1947. The Light Cpr
Division came to a rather sudden end.
On August 15, the light car was still very much in the
picture, but Youngren felt it was crowding the engineering
schedule. During the same period, General Motors, which was
also developing a light car, gave up the project "because of too
many other problems." Breech directed a survey be conducted.
The results indicated "most Americans wanted larger carp. . .
.
When we begin to ask about accessories, comments from all
areas show. . .that radios, heaters, lighters, clocks, sun-visors
34









Division was discontinued on September 13, 1947, although the
work in progress became the "French Ford. "
Creation of the proposed Ford Division was possibly the
most significant change in the organization and Nevin' s history
is quoted directly on this change.
With the appearance of the 1949 Ford, the time
approached for the creation of the Ford Division. This had
been difficult. . .and would come r^ore easily after new
personnel had been absorbed and the process of reorganization
was understood and put into practice. Furthermore, certain
high executives were not ready for it. Not only Davis, but
Bricker and Youngren objected. Breech followed the policy
he had learned from Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. , at General Motors:
"Wait until the opportune time." Early in 1949, this seemed
to have come. Bricke£;was about to retire to a director-
consultant status, Davis had suffered a heart attack, and
while he retained his vice-presidency, was replaced as
sales manager by Walker A. Williams. . . .
Crusoe was to head the division.
One circumstance perhaps helped to hasten the setting
up of the new division. The 1949 Ford, despite its promise,
(it was Youngren' s car) showed many minor defects; one of
Breech's friends, late in 1948, telephoned him that "these
cars are a piece of junk," afid particularized his assertion.
A meeting of the Ford officials concerned took up the
complaints. It was difficult to pin responsibility for them;
engineering blamed manufacturing, and vice versa. Breech
may well have recognized that with a Ford Division, the
responsibility would have been easier to fix, and the fault
easier to repair. 35
With the creation of the division, Breech completed the




team remaining in a dominating position was Bugas. The changes
that had taken place had caused no friction between Breech and
Henry II.
Ill . SUMMARY
The objectives of a firm serve as the continuing guiding
force for all the company's activities. The goal of all its
planning, and the base from which the administrative policies
of the firm emerge.
. .
.Objectives established over time
develop a certain character and create an image of the firm
.
Breech in rebuilding Ford had shaped it to the image of
General Motors, of this there is little doubt and that is exactly
what Henry Ford II hired him to do. In measuring the corporation's
progress over time, Breech and his executives would continue
to apply the G. M. yardstick. There is little doubt that when
Breech stated in 1950 that his objective was to build Ford to the
37
number one position in the industry, and "beat Chevrolet, " he
meant exactly that.
In choosing his staff, Breech had a relatively free hand and
his selection of these personnel from his former associates at
General Motors can only be described as typical or expected.
36Thomas J. McNichols , Policy Making and Executive Action
(New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 10'.
37
"Business Portraits," Fortune (April, 1950), p. 15.
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They were after all the men he knew and certainly, G. M. was a
ready source of experienced automobile men. Holding Thornton
in check insured Breech's dominance from the start and allowed
Crusoe to influence the other men in the group. Crusoe has
explained, "They knew nothing about business and the automobile
op
industry. Their knowledge was from books." 00 An unidentified
member of this group later stated, "I could not have had better
39
experience than I got under Mr. Crusoe's direction. "
Williamson argues that the existence of institutional
uniformities permit the proposed utility function to accjommodate
40
social choice problems. He further states that:
Although the leadership in the business firm is. . .subject
to constraints, often these will be redundant. That is, the
head of the organization will not find it in the least bit
constraining to make his choises from a subset known to be
acceptable to his subordinates. ,. .41
The rebuilt Ford organization would appear to have
established a group of executives, among whom choice problems
would not be constraining.
38Nevins, op. cit
. , p. 327.
39Ibid.
4°0. Williamson, The Economics of Discretionary Behavior :
Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm (Englewood, N. J.:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 162.
41Ibid. , p. 156.
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rord and Breech worked together so harmoniously that
to their associates they seemed almost interchangeable.
Discussion of proposed policies could be invoked by any of
the "team. " "We can get a decision at lunch-time," asserted
one vice-president.
Interpreting the public statements of men is, perhaps, one
of the least credible endeavors of a historian. A public
statement is, perhaps, in one sense, the equivalent of a cheer
at a football game. No one expects the other team to really be
given "the axe/' yet in another sense, it does reveal the desire
of the crowd. It is in this sense that the following statement of
Breech is offered as an objective of the Ford Motor Company.
"My job, " said Breech, "was to develop personnel,
organization, and policy methods of the Ford Motor Company."
When asked, "To what end, Mr.- Breech?" he replied: "To
the end of becoming the leading automobile manufacturer in
the United States."43
Some writers have speculated on the type of transformation
that occurred in Ford. The skills and concepts contained within
an organization policy are an obvious element in the company's
capabilities and probably less easy to change than plant and
equipment. The effect of these on the ability to produce new
products is obvious and is a significant criterion in selecting
4
among product alternatives.
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"A corporation is a social institution It is an
institution that tends to develop within it pressure groups and
empire builders. It develops taboos, prejudices, policies and
rules of thumb. It develops sacred cows and scapegoats. It
has pride in every corner instead of being oriented toward the
conquest of some aspects of the external environment; it has an
inclination toward introspection; it is qverly concerned with its
own internal problems The energies of the more talented,
more aggressive, more ambitious employees often seem to be
taken up with internal problems of power, prestige, and position."
While there is some truth in the above quotation when applied
to Ford or to any organization, at least the history reveals that in
deciding on the Edsel, they, over a period of years, at least,
considered the alternatives.
A report was presented to the Product Planning Committee
on February 17, 1949. It revived interest in the light car, at
least for a time. The report held that there were four million
potential customers for such a car and the first company to
1Thomas Ware, "An Executive's View Point," Operations
Research, Vol. VII (1959), pp. 3=4.
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produce one "would enjoy a distinct advantage of exclusive
penetration of the market," and that public interest warranted
"continuing and intensifying engineering development work in
that field. " The car was opposed by Crusoe who felt that the
Ford Division "should be allowed to determine what it believed
the desirable Ford passenger car should be. " The engineering
people also felt that it would require "devoted attention" that
could not be given to it at this time because of a crowded
schedule. The proposal was made that engineering should give
2the program continued study on a not=to-interfere basis.
At this time Ford had gained only 18.82 percent of the
market and net income for 1948 had been 96 million, 4.6 percent
3
of sales. They were still number three in the industry behind
G. M. and Chrysler.
The light car question was considered again in 1951 and
1952. In each case it was rejected by the Ford Division. "To
the average American" the Division said:
Our present car and its size represents an outward
symbol of prestige and well-being. It seems reasonable to
2Nevins, op. cit . , p. 350-352.
^See Table III, also Nevins appendix.
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ask if we need a smaller car, do we need a smaller
refrigerator or a smaller washing machine ?^
The division again won its point and the light car remained
on a research basis. This period was not a good period for
introduction of new cars since the Korean War had brought
production controls, price controls and material controls. These
quota controls were particularly vexing to Ford since they had
been fixed on the basis of 1947=1948 production and gave an
edge to Chrysler at a time when Ford felt they could gain more of
the market. The controls were not lifted until the spring of 1953.
In 1950, Ford held twenty-four percent of the market,
Chrysler 17.6 percent; G. M. was in first place with 45.38 per-
cent. Ford had become number two in the industry but felt that
the controls set them back and prevented growth.
The Light Car as a distinct project never appeared again as
a serious consideration until the compact cars became a big
selling item in 1958.
4Nevins, op. cit . , p. 369.
5
"U. S. Business, The Auto Industry , " Time,, Vol. 76 No. 4,
(July 23, 1953).
6See Appendix, Table III.
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The Lincoln-Mercury unit headed by Benson Ford was selling
in the medium and high priced field and would seem to hold some
promise for expansion. As Benson Ford stated in 1950, "From
the view-point of the total Ford Motor Company, what; should
Ford owners graduate to? The next logical step would be a
7Mercury. " The Mercury did not seem promising to the
executive committee although it consistently held over 4 .
5
8
percent of the market. In 1950, it sold as well as the Dodge
or Oldsmobile and remained competitive with these carp through-
out the period the Edsel was in planning. Benson Ford seemed
"unable to push a point of policy against men like J. R. Davis,
q
Harder, Yntema, Breech or Henry Ford II.
The unresolved problem that bothered the executive
committee seemed to be this:
Forty percent of new car buyers switch makes, either
sticking with the over-all manufacturer of their old model or
going to rival makes eighty-seven percent Chevrolet
owners stay in the G. M. family when they move to a higher
price car—they buy Pontiacs, Oldsmobiles, Buicks, even
Cadillacs. But only twenty-six percent of Ford owners move
up to a Mercury. About sixty-nine percent stick with one of
Ford Motor Company cars.10
'Nevins, op. cit . , p. 369.
8See Appendix, Table III.
^Nevins, op. cit
. , p. 368.
10
"New Developments in Marketing," Business Week
(June 8, 1957), p. 61.
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Crusoe stated, "We seem to be growing customers for G. M. n11
In December, 1954, after two years of preparation the
Forward Product Planning Committee submitted to the Executive
Committee , a six volume report . The report predicted among
other things, that the G. N. P. by 1965 would be 535 billion
(exceeded in 1961 by first quarter rate of 542 billion, constant
dollars). The number of cars in use would be 70 million (72.
1
million were registered in 1964). More than half the families in
the nation would have incomes of over five thousand dollars a
year and more than 40 percent of all cars sold would be in the
medium price range or better. The report further stated that Ford
1 7
should be in the medium-price field by that time. "
This report seemed to reinforce the impression which dated
from pre-war years that the Ford Company needed at least four
basic cars to compete with G. M. who offered five (Chevrolet,
Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick and Cadillac), and even Chrysler,
13
who offered four (Plymouth, Dodge, DeSoto, Chrysler).
^-Nevins, op . cit . , p. 370.
1 2John N . Brooks , The Fate of the Edsel and Other Business
Adventures
, (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 20-22.





Henry Ford II had appointed a so called "Davis Committee"
in January, 1952, to investigate this problem. The committee
was comprised of the company's "senior talent.": J. R. Davis,
Crusoe, Harder, Walker Williams, Yntema and Youngren. The
14
committee reported on April 30, 1952.
Although Henry Ford II had suggested that a suitable
program "may require the introduction of another car name, a new
dealer organization, and an additional car division;" the report
recommended only one of these changes.
The committee proposed that a new body be introduced with
the 1956 model and used for the Lincoln Cosmopolitan and Capri
to compete with the higher priced Buick and the Oldsmobile, to
be known as a Mercury; and that a lower-priced Mercury should
be taken from the Ford shell to compete with the Pontiac. 1 ^
The higher priced Mercury would be a new car, but the
committee explained that it were introduced with a separate name
the outlay involved and the risks to be taken would be great, and
that the wiser policy would be not to undertake them . It pointed





failures: the Marquette (1929, dropped in 1930), the Viking (1929,
dropped in 1931), and the La Salle (1927, dropped in 1940). It
further pointed out that if a new name were introduced, a new
dealer organization might be required, and that "this would be
difficult and risky. "*" The committee did recommend that the
Lincoln-Mercury Division be split and that the Continental,
discontinued in 1948, be revived.
T|ie Continental was reintroduced and a separate division
was established in July 1, 1952, headed by William Clay Ford.
The other recommendations of the Davis Committee were "shelved
indefinitely" in January, 1953, "coming as it does, concurrently
17
with substantial expansion in our facilities programs. "
The Continental had never been a seller. It was introduced
in 1939 and discontinued in 1948. Only 5,322 units had been
produced. Fortune magazine reported in 1950 that there was
general agreement among dealers that the Lincoln-Continental
was one of the most striking United States automobile designs
in the past twenty years. The Museum of Modern Art featured







production, according to Nevins, "seemed imperative."
OnM,ay 18, 1954, the Lincoln-Mercury Division made
another proposal to "invade" the medium to upper price range.
The car they proposed would have a Lincoln Body shell and a
Mercury chassis; it would sell above the Mercury. The real
difference between this proposal and the Davis Committee's
proposal was that Lincoln-Mercury proposed a new name. They
referred to the car as "the Edsel for identification." The Ford
Division objected to the fact that this might "put a lid on the
Ford Division specifications." The proposed car from this point
19
on was known as "the E car. "
I. SUMMARY
A decision maker' s definition of the situation is made up of
20
the following elements:
(1) Assumptions about future and current events.
(2) Knowledge of alternatives available for action.
(3) Estimates of the consequences of each of these alternatives,
18Ibid., p. 377.
19Ibid., p. 381.
™J. A. Howard, Marketing ;' Executive and Buyer Behavior




Normative decision processes require that these four
elements be brought together in choice situations. In the case
of the Edsel it would appear, that at least over a period of years,
each of the alternatives hypothesized in Chapter I had been
considered.
This chapter has made an attempt to array the alternatives
considered by Ford Motor Company on their product decision. In
doing this, some perspective is lost in the treatment of the
"light car" alternative. During the period under consideration,
there was a considerable body of evidence that a smaller,
cheaper car would not sell. The Nash, Crosley and Henry J.
were examples of seeming public rejection of small cars. The
1954-1955 model year seemed to indicate a rejection of the
lower priced Mainline Ford in favor of the more expensive
Fairlane. Crusoe classified the mainline as "practically non-
21
salable." Abernethy attributes this to the G. M. approach of
"bigger means better" adopted by the industry. The concept of
22
the smaller car does not require a sacrifice in functional utility.
21Nevins, op. cit . , p. 382.
22Sidney Furst and M. Sherman, Business Decisions That
Changed Our Lives (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 355=361.
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The Mainline and other so called low price cars of the Big Three
seemed to be "stripped down" versions of the more expensive
cars. The market for the Rambler did not make the "encouraging
23







I. THE FINAL DECISION
In early 1955, the executive structure of the company had
changed. Lewis Crusoe moved from head of the Ford Division to
become Executive Vice-President, Car and Truck Divisions;
McNamara was made head of Ford Division and F. C. Reith
became a member of Crusoe's staff and as such joined the
Product Planning Committee.
The Product Planning Committee was now chaired by Crusoe.
The automobile industry was in a state of optimism according
to Automotive® News :
At the moment, Detroit is in the middle of a boom, the
public has bought two million cars in the off peak season
from January to April, and now is established to be
buying at a 600,000 a month clip. That's a rate of more
than 7,000,000 a year. 2
In this atmosphere, Rieth presented an overall plan for Ford's
future. His plan was supported by an outside firm, Lehman
^llan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, Ford Decline and Rebirth
1933-1962 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963),
pp. 380=382.
2
"Automotive Industry, " Automotive News , Vol. 118, No. 7
(May 13, 1955), pp. 26-28.
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Brothers; the study pointed out that G. M. held about 50 percent
of the market. At G. M. , 45 percent of new car registrations
are in the medium-price field. At Chrysler, 47 percent are in the
medium -price field. At Ford, only 17 percent of the registrations
are in the medium-price field. When looked at from this view,
50 percent of G. M.°s volume rests on Chevrolet, while at Ford,
80 percent of volume is generated by the Ford automobile. This
means that the success and profitability depends on the Ford
Division alone.
The study went on to say that this imbalance shows in the
market-place. G. M. has 67 percent of the medium-low-market,
Ford 16 percent and Chrysler, 14 percent. In the upper-medium
bracket, G. M. has 56 percent, Chrysler, 29 percent and Ford,
3 percent if the Thunderbird in included. The study aj/so
concluded that when a company has two or more entries in the
medium-price field, the result is to strengthen the sales of all
3
its car lines.
Reith also pointed out that partly because of this gap the
company had fewer dealers than G. M. and Chrysler. The time
3,, Ford vsG, M. New Line Makes It A Car For Car Battle, "
Business Week , No. 1421 (November 24, 1956), pp. 26-28.
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was as "auspicious" as could be imagined. Population was
4growing, and consumer income was rising.
Reith's proposal was using three basic body shells; one
slightly modified to produce seven basic automobiles:
Number 1 for Ford mainline and other standard Fords.
Number 1 (modified) Ford Fair],ane and low-priced E car.
Number 2 Mercury and high-priced E car.
Number 3 New Super Mercury, Lincoln.
Reith's basic plan was approved by the Board of Directors
apparently as a result of or coincident with Reith's proposal, the
following organizational changes took place.
Lincoln-Mercury Division became two divisions; Ben Mills
became Vice-President of the company and was named General
Manager of the new Lincoln unit.
Reith was made a Vice-President and put in charge of the
Mercury unit.
A Special Products Division was formed to develop the E car
under R. E. Krafve.
William Clay Ford, at that time Vice-President and in charge








Benson Ford, formerly Vice-President and General Manager
of Lincoln-Mercury, now became Group Director of the Ford,
Lincoln-Mercury, and Special Products Division.
Richard Krafve had been a sales engineer and management
consultant before joining Ford in 1947 and was moved to his new
position from the Lincoln-Mercury Division.
'
II. THE DESIGN
The automobile was designed within the basic limitations
set by the production policy on body shells. The designer,
Roy A. Brown, actually the "stylist" said in an interview:
Our goal was to create a vehicle which would be unique
in the sense that it would be readily recognizable in -
styling theme from the nineteen other makes on the road at
the time. We went to the extent of making photographic
studies from some distance of all nineteen of these cars,
and it became obvious that at a distance of a few hundred
feet the similarity was so great that it was practically
impossible to distinguish one make from the others They
were all peas in a pod. We decided to select a style that
would be "new" in the sense that it was unique, and yet at
the same time familiar. ^
The car was presented on August 15, 1955, to the Product
Planning Committee, including Henry Ford II and Breech. During
6Ibid., p. 388.
7
"Portraits," Fortune (June, 1955), p. 78.
8John Brooks, "The Edsel," The New Yorker , Vol. XXXVI,




The audience sat in utter silence for what seemed like
a full minute, and then, as one man, burst into a round of
applause. Nothing of that kind had ever happened at an
intra-company first showing at Ford. . . .9
In so far as being unique, a novel horse-collar-shaped
radiator grill) was set vertically in the center of a conventionally
low, wide end. The rear end was a departure from the familiar
,
for instead of the high "tail fins" which were in style at the
time, there were wide-spread horizontal wings filled from the
rear with 25 inch tail lights, later dubbed gull wings. This
innovation was copied by the rest of the industry for the "tail fin"
disappeared from other models in 1959-1960.
George Walker, chief stylist for Ford said later, after the
Edsel was placed on the Market:
The front grill is a classic.
. .1 liked the "big package
look" of the car. You take Lowey's 51 Studebaker, that was
swell design, but it wasn't big. 10
Neil L. Blume, who was the engineer in charge of the Edsel,
stated that it was the styling group which was responsible for
the transmission control buttons which were placed in the center
g
John N. Brooks, The Fate of the Edsel and Other Business
Adventures (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 59=60.
10Thomas P„ Murphy, "How Edsel Lured Those Dealers,"
Fortifie (September, 1957), p. 146.
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of the steering column. This problem gave them "a fit" and was
not ready until just before production began. Engineering wasn't
at all sure it could be done. Blume also said that they tried to
build "selling points" into the car. These selling points,
"something for the dealers to talk about," consisted of such
items as a thermometer that displayed inside and outside
temperature , a speedometer which glowed red when it reached
f
a preset speed, push-button operation of the trunk and hood,
single control for both heating and cooling, and several other
almost nonfunctional items.
On the more functional side, the automobile in the larger
series was provided with a 385 horse power engine and in the
smaller version, 303 horse power. The engine was equipped
with a unique multiple thermostat system that overcame warm-up
11problems that were typical of the larger engines of that time.
The brakes provided were self-adjusting, and an air suspension
system was provided for later production models. Blume said,




llnThe NewEdsel," Consumer Report, Vol. 23, No. 1
(January, 1958), p. 29.




"Conventional market research never went into the Edsel.
Ford used a type of motivational research called imagery
13
studies." While this departure from standard practice seems
unusual, it is probably true, for no source indicates that any
other type of research was conducted.
Business Week observed that if the conventional studies
had been made, even in 1955, no "chink" in the middle price
bracket would have been observed.
This observation is supported by Roy Abernethy who has
stated that their decision (American Motors) to enter the compact
market in 1956 was carefully calculated, despite the fact that
the 1955 market consisted of 38 percent medium and upper-price
automobiles. According to Abernethy, the procedure to be
used was, to a great degree, responsible for G. M. taking the
lead from Ford in the 1930 era:
General Motors moved to capitalize on the fact that cars
could be glamorized and merchandized as symbols of status
of their owners. . .merchandising put heavy emphasis on the
symbolism theme. 5
13"Edsel Dies, Ford Regroups and Survives," Business Week
(November 28, 1959), p. 27.
14Sidney Furst and M. Sherman, Business Decisions That





The Director of Planning for Marketing Research for the
Special Products Division was David Wallace. He has stated
that in the planning for the Edsel, they followed this line:
We said to ourselves, lets face it, there is no great
difference in basic mechanisms between a two thousand
dollar Chevrolet and a six thousand dollar Cadillac. Forget
about all the ballyhoo, we said, and you'll see that they are
pretty much the same thing. Nevertheless, there's
something - there's got to be something in the make up of a
certain number of people that gives them a yen for a Cadillac,
in spite of its high price, or maybe because of it. . .we
concluded.
.
.cars are the means to a sort of dream fulfillment
. . .some irrational factor in people that makes them want
one kind of a car rather than another - something that has to
do with. . .the car's personality. !
Wallace has said that he and others at Ford were aware of
the research conducted by Pierre D. Martineau (Automobiles :
17What They Mean To Americans ) . Martineau was Director of
Research and Marketing at the Chicago Tribune and had first
presented his work in a lecture at the University of Michigan
in 1954. It was also published in another form in the Chicago
Tribune and later in the work cited. His study compared, among




Brooks, op . cit . , p. 27.
1 7
Pierre D. Martineau, Motivation In Advertising (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co. , Inc. , 1957), Chapter 6.
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Buick is seen as the car for successful people moving
upward. . .Ford retains from its tin-lizzie past. . .which
values it. . .for rugged wear, a plain farm car. It is intensely
attractive to youngsters. 18
These ideas were not new, but certainly they impressed
people in Ford at that time. Crusoe has been quoted as saying
,
"I don't want people to leave my store to buy something better. .
.
19
and stopping for a Buick. "
These studies used to measure the ineraction between buyer
20
and product might be interestingly applied to the interaction
between producer and product.
Wallace decided to make a full assessment of the
"personalities" of all of the medium-price automobiles on the
market and some of the lower-price models as well. Columbia
University Bureau of Applied Social Research was engaged to
interview 800 recent new car buyers in Peoria, Illinois, and 800
in San Bernardino, California. The survey supported the
Martineau Studies and assisted in finding the correct personality
for the E car.
18Ibid., pp. 41-49.
19William Marsh, "Edsel And How It Got That Way, "
Harpers , Vol. 215 (May, 1957), pp. 68-69.
20R. Ferber & H. G. Wales, Motivation And Market Behavior
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1958), p. 37.
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In early 1956, Wallace proposed the following in a report
to the Special Products Division:
The most advantageous personality for the E car might
well be the smart car for the younger executive or
professional family on its way up. Smart car: recognition
by others of the owner's good style and taste. Younger:
appealing to sprited but responsible adventurers. Executive
or Professional: Millions pretent to this status, whether
they can attain it or not. Family: not exclusively
masculine; a wholesome "good" role. On its way up: "The
E car has faith in you, son; we'll help you make it! " 21
The main task for Wallace now was to find a name for the E
car. To this end he hired research groups to poll in the streets.
He entered into a lengthy correspondence with the poet,
Marianne Moore, which was later published in the New Yorker
and by Morgan Library. 2 Although the correspondence was
charming, it yielded no usable name for the E car. Foote, Cone
and Bielding were called in and from a list of 6,000 names they
finally submitted four: Ranger, Pacer, Corsair, Citation. 2 ^
These were the proposed names that K^afve took to the
Executive Committee. In that meeting, Breech said that he didn't
21
Brooks, op. cit . , p. 32.
22Marianne Moore & Wallace David, "Department of
Amplification," The New Yorker, Vol. XXXIII No. 8 (April 13, 1957),
pp. 140-146.
23Brooks, op . cit . , p. 35.
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care for any of them and named the Edsel. This name was
objectionable to the Ford Brothers (not in attendance) but Henry
Ford II, when consulted after the meeting said, if it was the
committee's desire, he would abide by it. The other four names
were assigned to the four models of the car that were produced. 4
No break down on the full advertising expenditures is
available, but some appreciation of its size can be gained. The
advertising campaign was under the personal direction of
Fairfax M. Cone. The agency established a Detroit office to
handle the Edsel account. The office staff consisted of sixty
people other than those who came from the home offices.
IV. SELLING
Selling the Edsel with a new dealer organization was
generally considered by Ford and the other industry members to
be the most risky portion of the operation . The lack of a solid








"Automotive News," op. cit . , p. 36,
83

The best reason Ford could give for establishing a separate
dealer organization instead of "duaiing," an industry term
referring to one dealer having more than one make / was
explained by the Edsel sales manager, J. C. Doyle. It was
common knowledge that when dealers dualed and one car had an
off year, they would not "push it" and that compounded the sales
problem. The dual dealer would push only the good seller, -
usually the lower-priced car. G. M. does not dual except in
low volume areas and Chrysler has had problems in this field
also. Duaiing seems to be more expensive in the long run. The
only places Edsel would be duaied was in areas that would not
support the single car. Edsel needed about 1,200 dealers to open
sales.
In May, 1955, Doyle formed a planning group of nine men
and began a county by county breakdown of sales areas. The
group"took each area in the country's 60 major metropolitan
market areas and determined population, population over 21,
number of families, number of families with an intome over $4,000,
median value of homes, percent delapidation of homes, and
27
"How Edsel Lured Those Dealers, " op» cit . , p. 145.
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automobile population. Other factors were considered: location
of the income groupings, location of shopping centers, traffic .
flow, where "the automobile row" was and how vital it was,
op
location of other dealers. °
The studies were finished in September, 1956. The total
number of dealers required by "introduction day" was 1,184 and
the eventual number would be about 3,000. ^
Five regional sales offices were established (Newark,
Chicago, Detroit, New Orleans, San Francisco) with 24 districts
and 900 persons were placed as field sales representatives . The
30
marketing group in Detroit grew to 149 by January 1, 1957.
Doyle had some inter-divisional problems when he started
lining up dealers , since some of them came from the Ford
Division and some from former Lincoln-Mercury dealers. The
final grouping contained about 65% "shift over" dealers who left
other companies.
Doyle maintained that they were very careful to select only
31
"quality dealers," those with excellent reputations.
28Ibid.
29"How To Build A Dealer Empire, " Business Week
(June 22, 1957), p. 61.
30Ibid.
31 Murphy, op . cit . , p. 146.
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It was generally conceded within the industry that the Edsel
32dealer system was well established on "introduction day. "
V. MANUFACTURING
The Edsel was produced in plants along with Fords and
Mercurys. Krafve had asked for plants of his own, but was
33
turned down. Unfortunately, the first Edsels were of poor
quality. Automotive News reported that the earliest Edsels
suffered from poor paint, infereior sheet metal, and faulty
accessories. A former executive of the Edsel Division estimated
that only about half of the first Edsels really performed properly. 4
Krafve' s reasons for asking for his own plants were based on
the fear that in the Ford and Mercury plants, the Edsel would
suffer. He stated that inter-divisional rivalry was intense, but
he did not intend to imply that there were any conditions













This opinion was shared by Consumer Report:
The Edsel invites the standard warning against buying
cars produced before the assembly lines are running smoothly
and before at least some built-in troubles have been
rectified. The warning - applicable to any make - was
justified once again by C U's Edsel. 36
This problem in manufacturing is generally conceded to be a
standard problem in the automotive industry.
VI . THE OTHER DIVISIONS
Between the time that the Edsel was conceived and the time
that the car was introduced, the other divisions at Ford were
busy pusing into the middle price market. The reasons for this
policy are not clear, although, Business Week claims that the
independence of the divisions within Ford was responsible, for
after all, "the higher a car's price, the more profit," for any
given division. '
The situation Ford created looked like this:
1955 1958 Reith Proposal** 1958 Actual
Mean Industry Whole- $1881
sale Price $1572
Middle Price Market $2300
Start $2100
36
"The New Edsel," Consumer Report , Vol. 23 No. 1
(January, 1958), p. 30.
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Ford Mainline 6 Ford Mainline Ford Custom V8
1606-1753 1923-2054
Ford Customline 6 Ford Customline Ford Fairlane V8
1801-1845 2147-2332







F. Thunderbird F. Thunderbird F. Thunderbird
No Data No Data
Ford Fairlane 8 Ford Fairlane F. Fairlane 500
2014-2304 2289-2907
Mer. Custom Low Price E Car Edsel Ranger
2218-2686 2300-2466
Mer. Monterey Mer. Monterey Edsel Pacer
2400-2464 2499-2771
Mer. Montclair High Price E Car Mer. Monterey
2631-2712 2422-2822
























^Automotive Indu strie s , Vol. 118 No. 6 (March, 1958)
**Proposed Prices are not available.
***It is not clear from available sources whether the breakdown
was to include 6 cylinder as well as 8 cylinder cars in these
models.
The situation on the introduction of the Edsel was completely
different from Reith's proposed plan. Additionally, Chevrolet
and Plymouth had followed Crusoe's 1955 Fairlane into the
middle-price market.
It is no wonder that Fortune 1 s writer, Thomas P. Murphy,
questioned the reasoning of Ford on the introduction of the Edsel
in September, 1957:
No one questions consumer loyalty, no one questions
broad sales policy. But the basic pr0mise that the middle
-
price market is expanding is wrong, for to account for 60%
of sales, Ford had to use the three high-priced cars of the
traditionally low-priced three. Without counting these cars,
the field is not expanding. 38
Interestingly, American Motor's reading of the high point in
39
the middle -price market was 38%.
To reach the desired 200,000 units per year, the Edsel would
have to take about 3% of the total market. In September, 1957,
predictions were that the dealers would end the model year with






V. THE END OF THE EDSEL
In general, the Edsel was reported on favorably by the press
and periodicals, except Consumer Report , which purchased a
Corsair for test purposes. They happened to purchase a car
which suffered from the effects of initial production. The
delivered car had
Among other troubles, the wrong axle ratio, loss of
water when an expansion plug blew out, a noisy and leaking
power steering pump, noisy rear-axle gears and a heater
which issued blasts of hot air, whenever engine, speed
reached 3600 RPM. 40
The report went on to say that too much effort apparently
went into making a piece of novelty merchandise, too little into
making a superior vehicle. They rated the car the lowest of the
41
middle-price class. The other magazines who tested the car
found little to complain about, but all accused the car of being
too noisy and of having little road adhesion. If attacked at all,
the car was classed as being just another of Detroit's middle-
priced gadgets.
To reach the 200,000 unit goal, the Edsel would have to sell
at a rate of between 600 and 700 units per business day. The
40




first day of sales, 6,500 orders were place. 2 However, for
the first 10 days in October, 1957, sales were only 2,751.
The last major advertising attempt was made on Sunday,
October 13, 1957, when a television spectacular was put on at
a reported cost of 400,000 dollars. This apparently induced no
43
spurt in sales.
On the 27th of November, Edsel's only dealer in Manhattan
announced that he was dropping Edsel and taking on American
44
Motor's Rambler.
Edsel finished the year with sales of 26,681. The sales
picture across the automobile industry looked grim.
On January 14, 1958, Ford announced that it was
consolidating the Mercury, Lincoln and Edsel Divisions under
James J. Nance. Only the sales force of the Edsel Division
would remain intact. As a result of this consolidation, 6,000
salaried employees were released. The amount of advertising
devoted to the Edsel was reduced. Doyle has said that this




"Edsel Dies, Ford Regroups and Survives," loc. cit.
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move marked the end of the car. "With that much competition
in a division, the Edsel wasn't going anywhere; it became a
stepchild."46
The 1959 Edsel was offered in only two models and was
scaled down in size. The car was eight inches shorter, 500
pounds lighter and horse power had been reduced by 158 hor£e
power. Price was reduced by five to eight hundred dollars.
Consumer Report rated it as a "likeable car. "
By this time , Rambler had 4.0% of the market and the small
imported cars accounted for 8.12% of the market.
1959 sales were 40,779, about the same as De Soto sales,
but by now 16% of sales were going to American Motor's Rambler
and the foreign cars. A 1960 model was brought out without
"horse collar" in mid-October, 1959, a month after the Ford
Falcon, but was discontinued in November, when production had
47
slipped to 20 cars per day.
A report had been made to the Executive Committee in
January of 1959, recommending dropping the Edsel, but was not
approved because of anticipated dealer reaction. Consideration
46
Brooks, op . cit




had been given to marketing a new compact under the Edsel name
to preserve the dealers, but it was feared that the name alone
48
would be too much of a handicap.
VI. SUMMARY
The Edsel was simply an unprofitable venture. The
automobile was no better or no worse than any other middle-price
automobile on the market at the time. Mechanical problems that
plagued the first models were apparently anticipated and are part
of the hazard in introducing any new product in the automotive
industry.
The dealer organization was well planned and established and
sales did not suffer because of inadequacy in this area. The car
did sell, and rather well, if placed in comparison with other
automobiles. Sales for its total life were 109,466, ignoring
the 1960 model year. In two years time, it sold twice as well
as the "highly profitable Thunderbird" which sold only 53,166
units in the first three years of its life. 4 ^
The total sales are even more impressive when consideration
is given to the fact that 19§8 was only a 4.7 million unit year
across the industry, as opposed to 6 million in 1957 and 6.
1
48
"Edsel Dies, Ford Regroups and Survives, op. cit.
, p. 28.
49Nevins, op. cit . , p. 388.
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million in 1959. Motivational Research did not seem to hurt,
or help sales. This area is still a matter of controversy,
although it is conceded at this time that there is no evidence to
support the fact that an effective market policy can be based on
this strategy.
The middle -price market was a tight market at the time and
was made tighter by the introduction of the other divisions'
entries and this probably hurt sales, but the middle-price market
was not destroyed by the sfnall car. Ford apparently had good
reason to enter the market, based on their economic forecasts
which were largely correct, if on the low side. There is little
reason to believe that Ford executives were rash enough to
believe they had reached the projected "millennium" in 1955.
Total registrations were 52.1 million in 1955 and their report
predicted only 70 million by 1965, a relatively steady growth
rate.
In consideration of the "Light Car" there is suffipient
evidence to indicate that this alternative was unattractive both
from a profitability stand and from the standpoint of the
50
J. A. Howard, Marketing: Executive and Buyer Behavior




corporation's objectives of "dominating" the industry. It is also
possible to generalize that bounded by industry standards, they
could not conceptualize a light car as being any more than a
stripped-down version of a higher priced car, and as such non-
salable.
Quite simply, the economic production level was 200,000
units and it was not achieved. Kow much lower the economic
production level would have been under the alternative plans
proposed, or if these alternative plans could have met the
objective of gaining more of the middle-price market is partly a
matter of speculation. It can be said, however, that under any
of the other plans, the level would have been lower. The
enormity of the 200,000 unit level can be appreciated by
comparing industry figures. This volume in the peak industry
sales year of 1955 (also the decision year) represented more than
the total of all Chrylser and Imperial sales which were 156,518
combined; alternatively, it represented one third of the total
Buick sales. In 1956, the planning year, 2000, 000 units
represented about one half of Buick sales and was approximately
equal to combined Chrysler and De Soto sales. The production
51See Table III in Appendix.
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decision was remarkably high, yet required to support the
organization established.
Business Week summarized the situation . Within four years
time , Ford expanded to include the following automobile divisions!
Ford, Lincoln, Mercury, Edsel, Continental, then closed them
because sales weren't sufficient to carry the overhead. In
January, 1959, the Mercury-Lincoln and Edsel Divisions were
combined and 6,000 salaried employees were released. Upon
consolidating production and leaving the Lificoln-Mercury
Division (after Edsel was dropped in November, 1959) as a sales
division only an additional 600 salaried employees were dropped.
An additional casualty of the four year expansion was the
Continental Division. In regard to the demise of this division,
an unidentified Ford executive was reported as arguing that the
52
"prestige" of the Continental was worth the losses incurred.
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The Edsel case was presented as a test to confirm or deny
Williamson's hypothesis. An observation that indicated a failure
to respond to expense preference wtbuld consititute a
contradiction to the utility maximizing hypothesis. An
observation that expense preference was displayed would
support the hypothesis. Ambiguity is introduced into the test
by the fact that under both hypothesis (profit maximization and
utility maximization) direction of response to the environment is
the same. The difference between the two hypotheses being an
unmeasureable, greater-than or less-than term. This term is
the term that must be isolated to avoid a post hoc fallacy. The
behavioral assumptions on which Williamson's hypothesis is
based are strong enough that they would seem to support a
ceteri s paribus assumption of validity to supporting evidence.
In consideration of the above limitations on analysis, the
conclusion has been reached that the case does not deny the
hypothesis and does tend to support it.
The anlaysis is, of course, limited to the staff component
since no evidence on emoluments is available. The greater-than
term will remain ambiguous, although some appreciation of its
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magnitude can be gained. Lag effects over time, and the
generalizations necessary in historical review also limit the
validity of the conclusion. Historical review entails evaluation
of reported phenomena , and the suspicion always exists that if
more data were observed the evaluation might change.
I. REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
In considering alternatives, the high staff value was chosen
in the Edsel decision. This in itself could be supported by the
profit maximization assumption, for it may have been required to
achieve the objective. The decision, however, is suspect in
view of the Davis Committee report. It is less supportable
i
under an assumption of profit maximization when the decision
led to the formation of the separate Lincoln and Mercury
Divisions. Had the actions occurred sequentially over time,
there would be less indication of a positive taste for staff. The
decision to return the Continental to production under a separate
division is also relevant. There may have been a remote profit
value in the production of the automobile but it is difficult to
support the staff added on its contribution to profit.
The magnitude and rapidity of contraction of operations also
tends to support the expense preference hypothesis. The
contraction occurred in January, 1958. The Edsel itself had
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only been in production during the year 1957 and put on the
market on September fourth. The other divisions formed
concurrently with the Edsel had been in operation little more than
that. The contraction released 6,000 salaried personnel, this
does not include executives or production workers, and yet
productivity was higher in 1959 than in 1958. Total sales in
1958 were 1,230,394 units. In 1959 sales were 1,698,814. The
contribution to profit of staff in this case is again suspect. The
negative shift in demand in 1958 qualifies the last statement.
By extracting data from company and industry reports, the
value of the accumulated staff is difficult to support under an
assumption that the staff has been accumulated in anticipation
of future profits alone. The following years are isolated: 1954
represents the base year in which there is little evidence of
staff accumulation, 1957 is the high staff year, and 1959
represents operations after contraction.
Year Unit Total Sales $ Net Income Staff Sales $
Sales As % Sales Trend Trend
1954 1,706,617 4062.3 6.0 Base
1957 1,818,169 5771.3 5.1 + +40%
1959 1,698,814 5356.9 8.4 - +31%
i
*See Table I and III in Appendix. 1954 figures from Nevins.
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While these figures are gross, and possibly misleading,
(they are from year-end reports; product mix varied over the year;
cost data is not available) it is difficult to reconcile a 3.1%
increase in net income as a percent of sales between 1957 and
1959 with a lower volume of sales both in unit and dollar terms
in 1959. By introducing the assumption of expense preference,
it becomes less difficult.
It is reasonable to assume that the adversity encountered
in 1958 moved the firm to the profit maximizing position where
staff was valued only for its contribution! to productivity. The
apparent ease of the return to higher profits by organizational
shifts alone would appear to indicate an excess accumulation of
staff.
A generalization on the shift in price and model offerings by
the divisions may be possible. The assumption that higher staff
preference requires a higher value of output could explain the
deviation from the original Re ith proposal. The original plan
envisioned only two Mercurys and two Edsels. It would seem
that the creation of the separate divisions required the additional
models to support their individual profits. This conclusion is
only speculative since no evidence could be found on this
subject, but it does conform to the Williamson hypothesis.
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No observations were made which indicated a failure to
respond to expense preference after 1952. Responses, due to
the Korean War restrictions, until 1953 were largely restricted
by government controls. Prior to 1949, the company's
profitability position would restrict opportunities for discretion.
II. IN RELATION TO OTHER MODELS
Models are abstract representation of reality which
help us to perceive significant relations in the real world,
to manipulate them, and thereby predict others. They may
take any of numerous forms.
.
.many are simply
representations on paper - like mathematical models. Or,
finally, they may be simple sets of relationships that are
sketched out in the mind and not formally put down on paper.
In no case are models photographic reproductions of reality
. . . .Whether or not one model is better than another depends
.... solely on whether it gives better predictions .... 1
The above quotation points out both the strength and
weakness of the Williamson models. It is sufficient to say that
in general an unambiguous profit term is more amenable to
quantification than is a concept of expense preference and
utility maximization. Alternatively, the simple profit term is
deceiving in some cases because of its limited commitment to
human motivation.
Charles Hitch & Roland McKean, The Economics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Rand
Corporation, 1960), p. 119.
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Conceptualizing a utility function of the Williamson
hypothesis may help in perception of significant relationships in
the real world. Its appeal is in the attempt to bridge the gap
between economics and the behavioral sciences. It's validity is
subject to question because of the quantitative ambiguity of its
significant terms. The &ost Iftoc nature of evidence in its support
is also suspect. Its significance may lie only in the insight it
allows in examination of situations which from the models of





Boulding, Kenneth E. The Image. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1956.
Brooks, John N. The Fate of the Edsel and Other Business
Adventures
. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
Dichter, Ernesto Handbook of Consumer Motivations . New York:
McGraw - Hill Book Company, 1964.
Drucker, Peter F. Concept of the Corporations . New York:
Beacon Press, 1960.
Ferber, Robert and Wales, Hugh G„ Motivation and Market
Behavior . Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1958
Furst, Sidney and Sherman, Milton. Business Decisions That
Changed Our Lives . New York: Random House, 1964.
Hitch, Charles J. and McKean, Roland N. The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age . Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Colonial Press, Inc., 1963.
Howard, John A. Marketing : Executive and Buyer Behavior.
New York and London. Columbia University Press, 1963.
Martineau, Pierre D. Motivation in Advertising . New York:
McGraw - Hill Book Company, 1957.
McNichols, Thomas J. Policy Making and Executive Action.
New York: McGraw - Hill Book Company, 1963.
Nevins, Allan and Hill, F„ E. Ford Decline and Rebirth 1933-
19.62 . New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963.
Williamson, Oliver E. The Economics of Discretionary Behavior:
Managerial Obj ectives in a Theory of the Firm . Englewood




"Annual Statistical Review," Automotive Industries , Vol. 119
through 124 No. 6 (March 15, 1956 through 1961).
"Automotive News," Automotive Industries, Vol. 118 No. 7
(May 13, 1955), pp. 26-28.
Brooks, John. "The Edsel," The New Yorker , XXXVI No. 41
(November 26, 1960), pp. 34-60.
Burck, Gilbert and Parker, Sanford. "Detroit's Next Decade,"
Fortune
, LX No. 4 (October, 1959), pp. 112-115.
"Business Portraits," Fortune (April, 1950), p. 15.
"Edsel Dies, Ford Regroups and Survives," Business Week
(November 28, 1959), p. 27.
"Ford vs G. M. New Line Makes It A Car Battle, " Business Week ,
No. 1421 (November 24, 1956), pp. 26-28.
Hayakawa, S. I. "Why the Edsel Laid an Egg," Etc. XV No. 3
(Spring, 1958), pp. 217-222.
"How to Build a Dealer Empire," Business Week (Tune 22, 1957),
p. 61.
Moore, Marianne and David, Wallace. "Department of
Amplification," The New Yorker , XXXIII No. 8 (April 13, 1957),
pp. 140-146.
Marsh, William. "Edsel and How it Got that Way," Harpers,
Vol. 215 (May, 1957), pp. 68-69.
Murphy, Thomas. "How Edsel Cured Those Dealers," Fortune ,
(September, 1957), p. 146.
"New Developments in Marketing," Business Week (June 8, 1957),
p. 61.
"Portraits," Fortune (Tune, 1955), p. 78.
104

"U. S. Business, The Auto Industry, " Time , Vol. 76 No. 4
(July 23, 1953).
Ware, Thomas. "An Executive's View Point, " Operations
Research, VII (1959), pp. 3=4.
C. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS





FINANCIAL RECORD OF THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY
AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES
1955-1960




Sales $5237.9 5356.9 4130.3 5771.3 4247.0 5594.0
Income before
income taxes $ 774.7 842.8 182.5 580.6 490.4 985.6
Provisions for
income taxes $ 346.8 391.4 66.3 286.6 242.2- 531.4
Net income $ 427.9 451.4 116.2 294.0 248.2 454.2
As a % of sales % 8.2 8.4 2.18 5.1 5.3 8.1
Dividends paid $ 164.6 153.5 130.7 129.6 174.7 89.8




izations , and re-
placement of fac-
ilities (excluding
special tools) $ 128.2 75.0 328.7 214.0 279.9 151.5
Retirements of
property, plant
& equipment $ 40.4 66.2 45.4 50.2 49.8 30.2
Depreciation $ 164.0 172.9 187.3 177.1 133.5 116.0
Expenditures
for sp. tools $ 160.5 154.8 148.0 218.9 273.5 93.0
Amortization
for sp. tools $ 143.6 188.3 £15.9 208.8 128.2 122.9
YEAR END POSITION
Property, plant
& equipment $2678.4 2574.0 2598.7 2623.3 2335.4 2754.0
Accumulated
depreciation $1162.7 1037.7 925.4 781.0 649.3 561.6
Net property,




Net Income $ 7,.80 8,,24 2.,12 5 .40 4,.60 8..51
Dividends $ 3,.00 2,.80 2.,00 2 .40 2,.40 3..27



























NEW PASSENGER CAR REGISTRATIONS BY MAKE AND NAME
1946 1947 1948
Make Units % Unifcs % Units %
Chrysler 65532 3.61 93871 2.96 105315 3.02
De Soto 54420 2.99 72966 2.30 82454 2.36
Dodge 135488 7.46 209552 6.62 213923 6.13
Plymouth 211800 11.68 313118 9.86 347174 9.94
Total Chr. 467240 25.74 689507 21.77 748866 21.45
Ford 326022 18.01 532646 16.82 486888 13.95
Lincoln 10798 .59 24081 .76 32638 .93
Mercury 61187 3.37 111198 3.51 137512 3.94
Total Fd. 398807 21.97 667925 21.09 657038 18.82
Buick 126322 6.96 246115 7.77 244762 7.01
Cadillac 23666 7.30 53379 1.69 59379 1.70
Chevrolet 329601 18.16 640709 20.23 709609 20.33
Oldsmobile 93094 5.13 180078 5.68 175531 5.03
Pontiac 113109 6.23 206411 6.52 228939 6.56
Total G. M. 685792 37.78 1326629 41.89 1418220 40.63
Fr$zer 1873 .10 51158 1.62 57994 1.66
Henry J. = _ = „ - - - - - - - -
Kaiser 3501 .19 55571 1.74 108367 3.10
Total K.F. 166361 4.76 106729 3.37 5374 .29
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Crosley 286a .16 15934 .50 25400 .73
Hudson 7248* 3.99 83344 2.63 109497 3.14
Nash 85169 4.69 102808 3.25 104156 2.98
Packard 36435 2.01 47875 1.51 77843 2.23
Studebaker 58051 3.20 102123 3.22 143120 4.10
W illys 2329 .13 23400 .74 21408 .61
Misc. 647 .04 894 .03 2910 .09
Total Inde. 263357 14.51 483107 15.25 650695 18.64
194S i 195C i 1951
Make Units % Units % Units %
Chrysler 130516 2.70 151300 2.39 149435 2.95
DeSoto 103311 2.14 115023 1.82 112643 2.23
Dodge 273530 5.65 300104 4.74 298603 5.90
Plymouth 527915 10.91 547367 8.65 542649 10.72
Total Chr. 1035272 21.40 1113794 17.6 1103330 21.80
Ford 806766 16.67 1166118 18.43 862309 17.04
Lincoln 37691 .78 34318 .54 25816 .51
Mercury 186629 3.68 318217 5.03 233339 4.61
Total Fd
.
1031086 21.31 1518653 24.00 1121464 22.16
Buick 372425 7.10 535807 8.47 392285 7.75
Cadillac 80880 .67 101825 1.61 97093 1.92
Chevrolet 1031466 21.32 1420399 22.45 1067042 21.08
Oldsfeobile 269351 5.57 372519 5.89 273472 5.40
Pontiac 321033 6.63 440528 6^96 337821 6.68
Total G. M. 2075155 42.89 2871078 45.38 2167713 42.83
Frkzer 15827 .33 11884 .19
Henry J. « „ _ „ 14339 .23 51372 1.02
Kaiser 57995 1.20 "85832 1.35 53386 1.03
Total K.F. 73822 1.53 112055 1.77 103658 2.05
110

Crosley 10175 .21 6896 .11 5304 .10
Hudson 137907 2.85 134219 2.12 96847 1.91
Nash 135328 2.80 175722 2.78 140035 2.77
Packard 97771 2.02 73155 1.16 66999 1.32
Studebaker 199460 4.12 268229 4.24 205514 4.08
Willys 28576 .59 33926 .53 26049 .51
Misc. 1539 .03 2375 .04 3162 .06
Total Inde
.
648578 14.15 806577 12.75 543910 10.75
1952 1953 1954
Make Units % Units % Units %
Chrysler 113392 2.73 153756 2.68 101741 1.84
DeSoto 91677 2.20 122342 2.13 76739 1.39
Dodge 246464 5.93 288812 5.03 154789 2.80
Plymouth 433134 10.41 660447 10.46 381078 6.87
Total Chr. 884667 21.27 1165357 20.30 714347 12), 90
Ford 732481 17.61 1116267 19.45 1400440 25.30
Lincoln 29110 .70 39169 .68 36251 .65
Mercury 185883 4.47 287717 5.02 269926 4.88
Total Fd. 947474 22.78 1443153 25.15 1706617 30.83
Buick 310806 7.47 454320 7.92 513497 9.28
Cadillac 87806 2.11 98612 1.72 110328 1.99
Chevrolet 852542 20.50 1342480 23.39 1417453 25.61
Oldsmobile 218189 5,25 305593 5.32 407150 7.35
Pontiac 266351 6.41 385692 6.72 358167 6.47
Total G. M. 1735694 41.74 2586697 45.07 2806595 50.70
111

Frazer _ „ =. «. am — _ _ _ _ _ _
Henry J. 30284 .73 11385 .20 - -
Kaiser 41022 .99 22825 .40 8889 .16
Total K. F. 71306 1.72 34210 .60 8889 .16
*Willys was part of K.F. from 1951 on •
Crosley 2678 .06 _, L j— .. m ca _ __
Hudson 78509 1.89 66797 1.16 35824 .65
Nash 142520 3.43 137507 2.40 82729 1.49
Packard 66346 1.60 71079 1.24 38396 .69
Studebaker 157902 3.80 161257 2.81 95914 1.74
Willys 41016 .99 42433 .74 17002 .31
Misc. 982 .02 3162 .06 2375 .04
Total Inde. 489954 11.79 482235 8.41 272240 4.92
1955 1956 1957
Make Units % Units % Units %
Hudson 20522 .29 11822 .29 4596 .07
Nash 37197 .52 25271 .42 9474 .16
Rambler 72227 1.00 70867 1.19 91469 1.53
Total A.M. 129946 1.81 107960 1.81 105539 1.76
Chrysler 144678 2.02 106853 1.79 106436 1.78
DeSoto 118062 1.65 100766 1.69 103915 1.74
Dodge 284323 3.96 220208 3.70 257488 4.30
Imperial 11840 .16 10460 .18 33017 .55
Plymouth 647352 9.03 483756 8.12 595503 9.97
Total Chr. 1206195 16.82 922043 15.48 1096359 18.34
112

Continental 606 .01 1564 .03 2490 .04
Edsel - - - - - - - =, 26681 .45
Ford 1573276 21.94 1375343 23.09 149361*7 24.97
Lincoln 35017 .49 42598 .72 34808 .58
Mercury 371837 5.19 274603 4.61 260573 4.35
Total Fd. 1980737 27.63 1694108 28.45 1818169 30.39
Buick 737879 10.29 529370 8.89 394553 6.60
Cadillac 141038 1.97 132952 2.23 141209 2.36
Chevrolet 1640681 22.88 1565399 26.29 1456288 24.34
Oldsmobile 589515 8.22 437896 7.35 371596 6.21
Pontiac 530007 7.39 358668 6.02 319719 5.34
Total G.M. 3639120 50.75 3024286 50.78 2683365 44.85
Packard 52103 .73 28396 .48 5189 .08
Studebaker 95761 1.38 76402 1.28 62565 1.05
Total 147864 2.06 104798'
f
1.76 67754 1.13
Misc. 7582 .11 3866 .07 4329 .07
1958 1959 1960
Make Units % Units % Units %
Hudson .. e= = .. .. <_=» — — —
Nash - - ~ e= _ - = - - =
Rambler 186373 4.00 363372 6.01 422273 6.42
Total A. M. 186373 4.00 363372 6.01 422273 6.42
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Chrysler 58573 1.26 64424 1.07 79752 1.21
DeSoto 47894 1.03 42488 .70 23063 .35
Dodge 135538 2.91 167277 2.76 356572 5.42
Imperial 14823 .32 18498 .31 16360 .25
Plymouth 391104 8.40 390104 6.46 445590 6.78
Total Chr. 647932 13.92 682791 11.30 921337 14.01
Comet 157515 2.40
Edsel 38601 .83 40778 .67 - - = -
Ford 1028893 22.11 1471249 24.35 1420352 21.60
Lincoln & C. 26605 .57 28815 .48 20711 .31
Mercury 136295 2.93 157972 2.62 150724 2.29
Total Fd. 1230394 26.44 1698814 28.12 1749302 26.60
Buick 263981 5.67 245909 4.07 267837 4.07
Cadillac 122651 2.63 135387 2.24 149593 2.27
Chevrolet 1234414 26.53 1419131 23.49 1696925 25.80
Oldsmobile 306566 6.59 360525 5.97 355798 5.41
Pontiac 229831 4.94 382137 6.33 399646 6.08
Total G. M. 2157443 46.36 2543089 42.10 2869799 43.63
Packard
Studebaker 47798 1.03 133382 2.21 106244 1.62
Total 47798 1.03 133382 2.21 106244 1.62
Misc. 6057 .13 5696 .09 8910 .14
Tot. U. S. 4275997 91.88 5427144 89.83 6077865 92.42
T. Foreign 378517 8.12 614131 10.17 498875 7.58
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